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REORIENTING THE PROCESS DUE:
USING JURISDICTION TO FORGE POST-
SETTLEMENT RELATIONSHIPS AMONG
LITIGANTS, COURTS, AND THE
PUBLIC IN CLASS AND OTHER
AGGREGATE LITIGATION
JUDITH RESNIK*
The 1966 revision of Rule 23 has shaped our political and legal imagination.
Building on the 1950 ruling of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Com-
pany, which approved the possibility of binding absentees nationwide through rep-
resentative litigation, Rule 23 expanded the groups eligible for class treatment.
Aggregation responded to felt social needs—for banks to pool trusts, school stu-
dents to enforce school desegregation injunctions, and consumers to pursue mone-
tary claims too small to bring individually.
Key to the legitimacy of doing so for Rule 23’s drafters was “the homogeneous
character” of claims, permitting an identity of interests between the representative
and absent members of the class. The 1966 Rule 23 put judges in charge twice: first,
to determine the shape of the class and the adequacy of the representation and
second, if a compromise was proposed, to assess again whether representative
plaintiffs had proffered a fair and adequate resolution.
Rule 23 gave a limited role to absentees, many of whom were in mandatory classes
from which no exit was possible. Added on late in the drafting was a mandate to
provide notice at the outset that class actions were pending. That notice was
required only for a subset of cases; individuals with monetary stakes were given
formal opportunities to “opt-out”—even if, as a practical matter, individual law-
suits were not likely feasible.
While not producing a mass of opt-outs, notice requirements have pushed the
processes of class actions into the public realm.  Class actions gained a visibility not
only because of the stakes and the judicial decisions on certification and settlement
but also through mass mailings that brought the idea of class actions into the homes
of millions of potential beneficiaries of lawsuits.
Aspirations and utility thus combined to reframe constitutional understandings of
the “process due” by legitimating the authority of courts to deal in the aggregate
* Copyright © 2017 by Judith Resnik, Arthur Liman Professor of Law, Yale Law
School. This essay was prompted by the Rule 23@50 Conference, held by the Center on
Civil Justice and the N.Y.U. Law Review in December of 2016. Thanks are due to the Law
Review and to Sam Issacharoff and Peter Zimroth for asking me to join; to Reva Siegel,
Abbe Gluck, Dennis Curtis, and other participants in the Yale Faculty Workshop; to John
Leubsdorf for thoughtful readings of this draft; to persistent and engaged students with
whom I have learned a great deal—Matt Butler, David Chen, Clare Kane, Marianna Mao,
Catherine McCarthy, Urja Mittal, Heather Richard, Regina Wang, Emily Wanger, and Iva
Velickovic; and to Bonnie Posick, for her expert editorial assistance. Special thanks are due
to the librarians and staff at the Harvard Law Library’s Historical and Special Collections
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without individuals affirmatively consenting to participate when cases began. But
what fifty years of experience with class actions and related forms of aggregation—
including multi-district litigation (MDL) and bankruptcy—have made plain is that
an aggregate litigation’s life-span often continues after settlement or trial. New
information can emerge about difficulties in effectuating relief, as can conflicts
among claimants, whose “homogeneous character” may diminish after resolution.
Thus, aggregate litigation in practice has come to have three phases—certification,
resolution by settlement or trial, and implementation of remedies.
Critics of class actions, aiming to disable their use, rely on problems of implementa-
tion to argue against certification at the outset, and they invoke due process rights
of both defendants and absent plaintiffs. A new law of due process is also emerging
in the arena of personal jurisdiction—as the Supreme Court circumscribes the
ability of courts to decide claims involving non-resident defendants. I bring that
doctrine into discussions of class actions, first because the Supreme Court expanded
the ability to aggregate litigants in 1950 through expanding jurisdiction and second
because the Court’s decisions reflect unease with adjudicative authority not founded
on relationships among the forum and those whose rights are decided. The concern
about ensuring that defendants are “at home” parallels class action notice, as both
seek forms of affiliation between litigants and the jurisdictions deciding their rights.
The Supreme Court has used its new personal jurisdiction law to circumscribe the
scope of courts’ reach.  Here I propose to borrow its concerns for the opposite
purpose—to build affiliations so to expand the authority of courts during aggrega-
tion’s third phase. Aggregation’s pooling of resources has new importance today, as
tens of thousands of civil litigants appear in state and federal courts without law-
yers. Revising its practices is one way for democratic polities to help all classes of
persons have access to court-based remedies.
In 1950 in Mullane, the Supreme Court approved what has been called “jurisdic-
tion by necessity” to license state courts to determine the rights of all claimants
when lawsuits had a nexus with the forum and notice was provided.  In this century,
the Court should likewise recognize the necessity of giving judges jurisdiction to
oversee aggregation post-settlement so as to monitor implementation, respond to
conflicts, and assess distributional equities.  And, just as the 1966 Rule drafters
turned to notice as a means of doing “something” to connect  litigants with courts,
notice can again be put to work during aggregation’s third phase to provide the
“publicity” (to borrow from Jeremy Bentham) that makes connections possible and
that forces the practices of courts, lawyers, and auxiliary personnel before the
public.
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I
THE PUZZLES OF LEGITIMATING COURTS’ RELATIONSHIPS
TO LITIGANTS: CLASS ACTIONS, NOTICE, AND
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
“The question whether a binding class action is proper must not
become tied in mechanical fashion to the question whether notice has
been given; the grand criterion for a class action remains the homoge-
neous character of the class.”
—1962 Memorandum from the Reporters to the Advisory Com-
mittee Revising the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1
1 (Preliminary Memorandum) Modifications of the Provisions for Class Actions,
appended to Tentative Proposal to Modify Provisions Governing Class Actions—Rule 23,
at EE-11 n.5 (dated in Congressional Information Services (CIS) compilation as May
28–30, 1962) [hereinafter Tentative Proposal and Modifications Class Action, May 1962], at
CIS No. CI-6309-44. The memorandum was referenced in a related memo, “Class
Actions—Some Further Thoughts,” which has a handwritten note “August 1962,” at its
top; the Further Thoughts memo noted that the Modifications memo had been provided in
advance of the May 28–29, 1962 meeting of the Advisory Committee of Civil Rules,
drafting Rule 23. See Class Actions—Some Further Thoughts 1 (Aug. 1962) [hereinafter
Class Actions—Some Further Thoughts 1962], from the papers of Professor Kaplan
archived in the Historical and Special Collections of the Harvard Law Library, at Box 75,
folder 5 in the Benjamin Kaplan Papers, 1939–2010, at the Historical and Special
Collections of the Harvard Law Library [hereinafter Kaplan Papers].
A word on sources is thus in order. The Harvard Law Library’s finding guide, entitled
“Kaplan, Benjamin. Papers, 1939–2010: Finding Aid,” is available at: http://
oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/~law00250. References are to materials in specific boxes
and, when available, the subfolders. Many of the memos are not signed; several use the
term “we”; a few have both reporters’ initials or names noted at the outset, and some
reference the Reporter’s memo (singular). Kaplan was the Reporter and Professor Al
Sacks the Associate Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, which developed
the revisions to Rule 23 (as well as to several other rules). Kaplan is assumed to be the
primary author of materials on Rule 23 because he was the principal reporter; his
correspondence to committee members as well as a transcript of a meeting in 1963
recorded that he took the lead in many exchanges; Sacks is known for having been
intensely involved in revising discovery rules, and Kaplan published articles after 1966
about Rule 23. I have reviewed some but not all of the materials in the archive from
Professor Sacks, see Sacks, Albert, Papers, 1915–1991: Finding Aid, Harvard Law Sch.
Library, http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/~law00259 (last visited July 24, 2017),
which makes plain that he participated in some aspects of the Rule 23 revisions. Therefore,
I have referenced the memos as from the Reporters and explained the sources and the
dates.
In addition to the Kaplan and the Sacks papers, other resources on rulemaking are
also publicly available, albeit some behind pay walls; for example, the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts (AO) has posted a subset of materials from the Rules
Committees on its website, including rules suggestions and comments, committee reports,
and meeting minutes.  Records and Archives of the Rules Committees, Admin. Office of
the U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-archives-rules-
committees [https://perma.cc/JV59-CAMD].
I have also reviewed unpublished materials located in boxes housed in the late 1980s,
warehoused in a facility in Maryland, and archived in the National Records Center as
Record Group No. 116, Accession No. 82-0028. Thereafter, the Congressional Information
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The 1966 revision of Rule 23 has shaped our political and legal
imagination. The Rule’s structure transformed the potential for courts
to issue binding judgments precluding subsequent litigation. The
Rule’s impact can be found across the litigation docket, from injunc-
tions governing schools and prisons to distributions of damages for oil
spills, fuel emissions, and harmful drugs. The pattern has become
familiar, with motions to certify and to settle class actions dotting the
news and the case reports, along with class-action notices regularly
delivered by the U.S. Postal Service or electronically to the homes of
millions of people.
Yet, as reflected in the epigraph from a 1962 memo written to the
Rule drafters, today’s assumption that individual notice is at the heart
of the constitutionality and legitimacy of class actions was not the
focal point of exchanges in the early 1960s as the Rule was crafted.
Archived materials from Harvard Law School Professors Benjamin
Kaplan (the Reporter to the Advisory Committee and the principal
drafter of the Rule) and Al Sacks (the Associate Reporter) include
exchanges debating what kind of classes ought to be authorized, when
and how to let anyone know about the pendency of representative
actions, and how judges should relate, if at all, to absentees.
Moreover, as promulgated in 1966 and as in effect today, Rule 23
neither requires notice at the front-end to members of all classes nor
addresses the question of whether notice is required if cases go to
trial, rather than settle or be dismissed. Further, Rule 23 falls silent
once settlements have been approved. The Rule places no obligations
on parties to inform judges or the public about the results of settle-
ments, in terms of the implementation of whatever remedies are
required, nor for judges to be in contact with the litigants affected.
These lacunae are at the center of this essay—exploring the
remarkable success of Rule 23 in creating new relationships among
litigants and courts and arguing the need to do more. Rule 23 con-
firmed that courts could, constitutionally, decide about the rights of
absent, as well as present, litigants. To do so, the rule-drafters saw that
Service (CIS) put some of the National Archive Records on microfiche that libraries can
obtain. These records are indexed in a volume entitled Records of the U.S. Judicial
Conference: Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedures, 1935–1988. For each item
listed by name, the index provides an ID number. For example, materials are identified as
CI-7003 to indicate the card number on which the material can be found (i.e., the roll of
microfiche), and -03 to identify the specific frame. See RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE: COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, 1935–1988, at ix
(“User Instructions”). CIS provides dates for specific items or by group. Id. I have also
used some research materials provided by Andrew Bradt of some materials from the
papers of Dean Phil C. Neal, who helped to shape multidistrict litigation (MDL) and which
are archived at the University of Chicago.
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problems of legitimacy could be solved by court superintendence
during two phases—when classes were certified and if classes were
settled. Thus, the rule dispatched judges to assess facets of whether a
group cohered—numerosity, typicality, and commonality, as we have
come to call the first three criteria of Rule 23(a).2 The fourth prereq-
uisite was adequacy of representation, requiring an inquiry into the
named representatives’ relationship to class members to assure that
no conflicts of interests existed and that lawyers had the resources and
knowledge to work well on behalf of the class. As is also familiar, the
Rule then charged judges with determining whether, if these prerequi-
sites were met, class membership would be mandatory under 23(b)(1)
and (2) or optional, with formal rights of exit via 23(b)(3).3
Here, I preview the argument to come by sketching the varie-
gated relationships among aggregation, jurisdiction, participation in
lawsuits, notice, legitimacy of court decisions, and ideas about the pro-
cess due. A first point is that aggregation, enabling economies of scale
for a variety of claims, has become normatively acceptable across the
litigation spectrum—even if its pervasive impact has sparked a host of
efforts to derail it.
Second, anchoring the ordinariness of aggregation required
rethinking the relationships between courts and litigants and revising
ideas about what process was due. As reflected in the archival mate-
rials on the options under consideration between 1962 and 1966 when
Rule 23 was formulated, the indeterminacy of due process law at the
time meant that various routes seemed to be plausibly constitutional
methods of binding absent individuals through representative litiga-
tion. Rather than looking at these archives for the  “drafters’ intent,”
my interest is in their puzzles and inventions. Positing that judges
could identify groups sharing common interests, the drafters did not
focus on how to address conflicts within classes after settlement, when
remedies were to be implemented. Centered on classes based on the
“homogeneous character of the class,”4 the drafters gave judges the
task of overseeing the adequacy of representation at two points in
time—certification and settlement.
The 1966 class action rule revisions also reflected a growing
awareness that the egalitarian promise of a “day in court” could not,
absent different forms of litigation subsidies, welcome individuals
across the economic spectrum. Yet to use aggregation as a means of
supporting access to courts entailed attenuating individual participa-
2 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 95–96 (1966).
3 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(c), (d), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 96–98 (1966).
4 Tentative Proposal and Modifications Class Action, May 1962, supra note 1, at E-11, R
n.5.
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tion in a lawsuit, which had been the  predicate relied upon to legiti-
mate the imposition of a court’s judgment.  Fierce in seeing the
“necessity” for court action,5 Rule 23’s drafters relaxed expectations
of individual participation; they were confident in their self-described
“paternalistic” faith that judges could identify “homogeneous” claims
appropriate for joint resolution.6
Individual participation was not their core concern; identity of
interest was. The drafters referenced the 1940 decision of Hansberry v.
Lee, which made plain both the potential to bind absentees and the
need to ensure adequate representation based on an identity of inter-
ests.7 Further, Rule 23’s drafters thought that, at least as a matter of
“common decency,” even if courts did not need absentees’ participa-
tion, people should be told that their rights were being resolved.8 They
turned to the “gesture” of notice to provide some connection between
courts and those who were to be subjected to their judgments. Yet the
drafters also understood that pressures to be part of class actions
would be significant, perhaps constituting “compulsion.”9 What
people might do upon receipt of notices was not much in focus, in part
because of the drafters’ hope that if “solidarity of interest” was
strong,10 and if the judges were wise, the right results would be patent.
Third, those of us who have never lived outside Rule 23’s
umbrella may undervalue how creative the Rule was in bringing into
being new legal relationships among class members, their counsel, the
public, and courts—played out in tens of hundreds of lawsuits.11
People who did not know each other and whose only commonality
5 The term “jurisdiction by necessity” comes from George B. Fraser, Jr., Jurisdiction
by Necessity—An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 305 (1951). See infra
notes 87–106 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & R
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
6 Tentative Proposal and Modifications Class Action, May 1962, supra note 1, at EE- R
11, n.5.
7 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
8 Modification of Rule 23 on Class Actions, CI-6313-56, at EE-5 (1963) [hereinafter
Modification of Rule 23, 1963] and at Kaplan Papers, Box 79, Folder 4 (quoting
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 230 (1950)). Chafee’s discussion of
“common decency” was also cited in the memorandum, Tentative Proposal and
Modifications Class Action, May 1962, supra note 1, at EE-9 to EE-10, and repeatedly in R
the Advisory Committee’s note to the 1966 amendments to Rule 23. See infra notes 74–84 R
and accompanying text.
9 Class Actions—Some Further Thoughts 1962, supra note 1, at Box 75, Folder 2, at R
10.
10 Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 376 (1967).
11 Accurate data on the numbers of certified, as well as of proposed class actions, are
not available. See Deborah R. Hensler, Happy 50th Anniversary, Rule 23! Shouldn’t We
Know You Better After All This Time?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
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might be that they purchased the same product gained legal identity as
a cohort advancing claims in court. The class became a litigating
entity, able to produce binding outcomes for a host of diverse individ-
uals.12 As judges interrogated the quality of representation when cer-
tifications and settlements were challenged, judges became deeply
enmeshed in validating class actions and came to understand them-
selves as “fiduciaries” for absentees.
For cases involving monetary relief, notice became the vehicle for
disseminating information about the pendency of the claim.  And
while not producing a mass of opt-outs, the millions of mailed notices
helped—along with the stakes of the cases and courts’ decisions—to
put class actions on the front pages of newspapers and into the public
sphere.
This new approach to due process became conventional wisdom.
The legitimacy that class actions had gained was underscored in 2008,
when the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Sturgell rejected a common law
doctrine of “virtual representation” through which one individual law-
suit could preclude another, based on the overlap between parties.13
The details merit recounting because the two plaintiffs had more in
common than members of many  class actions. The plaintiff in the
second lawsuit, Brent Taylor, had served as the president of the
Antique Airplane Association,14 as had the plaintiff, Greg Herrick, in
the first lawsuit. The same lawyer filed both cases,15 based on the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
Both lawsuits sought the design for an F-45, a “vintage model”
airplane manufactured in the 1930s by the Fairchild Engine and Air-
plane Corporation.16 Herrick lost on the grounds that the 1930s plans
had regained their trade secret status after the company had objected
to disclosure by the Federal Aviation Association in the 1950s.17 The
12 See generally David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (1998). Why and when to pierce the concept of the class as an
entity and consider its function as an “aggregation” of individuals is discussed infra note 31 R
and accompanying text.
13 See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008).
14 Taylor v. Blakey, No. 03-0173, 2005 WL 6003553, at *1 (D.D.C. May 12, 2005).
15 The attorney listed as counsel of record, Michael John Pangia, had represented
Herrick as well. Herrick v. Garvey, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1322 (D. Wyo. 2000).
16 Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 885–86.
17 Herrick v. Garvey, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1328–29 (D. Wyo. 2000). The Herrick case
had argued that 1955 materials from the manufacturer had authorized public disclosure of
documents that it had submitted to the government when initially obtaining manufacture
and sale permission from the Civil Aeronautics Authority, the predecessor to the Federal
Aviation Administration (“FAA”). Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 886–87. The district court
commented that “only sixteen” of the F-45 planes were ever built. Herrick, 200 F. Supp. 2d
at 1323. That court noted that the documents had not in fact been released and further,
that reasserting the private right reversed its waiver. Id. at 1329.
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Tenth Circuit affirmed and declined to reach the legal questions,
raised belatedly, of whether trade secret status could attach after a
FOIA request was made or could be “restored” and, if so, how and
when.18
Taylor filed in the District of Columbia and argued that the 1930s
plans were no longer protected as trade secrets.19 Taylor lost at the
district and circuit levels on the grounds that Herrick had been his
“virtual” representative, sharing “the same incentive” to obtain disclo-
sure.20 The D.C. Circuit thought that without preclusion, “tactical”
manipulation by a second litigant would permit “multiple bites of the
litigatory apple.”21
The Supreme Court disagreed; professional connections and
friendship, shared lawyers, documents, and the same goal of disclo-
sure were not the proper bases on which to preclude Taylor from
going forward.22 Herrick and Taylor had no formal relationship—gen-
erated through legal categories of relationship or through notice of
proceedings—that licensed preclusion. Yet, while rejecting “virtual”
representation despite these multiple points of overlap, the Court reit-
erated the variety of ways in which individuals could be precluded,
despite not being named as parties.23 That list included contracts that
authorized representation; factual control over a lawsuit that resulted
in practical participation; and a variety of relationships created
through law by rules or statutes, such as assignee and assignor, proxies
and actors in privity, and class actions, trusteeship, and bankruptcy.24
Taylor v. Sturgell is thus one of many Supreme Court decisions
since the 1970s illustrating the acceptance of class actions as a form,
even as some of the Court’s rulings have rejected its use in particular
cases.25 Indeed, despite the 1966 Advisory Committee commentary
explaining that mass torts were generally not appropriate for class
18 Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 887; see Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d 1184, 1194 n.10 (10th Cir.
2002).
19 Blakey, 2005 WL 6003553, at *1–2.
20 See Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d 965, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Blakey, 2005 WL 6003553,
at *6.
21 Blakey, 490 F.3d at 975 (internal quotation marks omitted).
22 Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 905–07. As I have noted elsewhere, FOIA could also be read as
creating individual rights that would support another basis for refusing preclusion. See
Judith Resnik, Compared to What?: ALI Aggregation and the Shifting Contours of Due
Process and of Lawyers’ Powers, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628 (2011).
23 Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 892–96.
24 Id.
25 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); Comcast Corp. v.
Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). See generally Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A
Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 78 (2011).
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treatment, aggregate tort litigation has since become commonplace.26
One means of doing so has been through the multidistrict litigation
(MDL) statute,27 enacted in 1968, two years after the new Rule 23 was
promulgated. That statute requires the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation to assess whether its criteria for pre-trial aggregation are
met (“civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact
. . . pending in different districts”).28 The Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts  tracks cases consolidated under MDL; as of the fall of
2015, almost forty percent of pending federal civil cases were part of
MDLs, clustered before a single federal judge to whom cases were
consolidated for pre-trial proceedings.29 When moving from the level
of an MDL to the cases within, mass torts represented more than
ninety percent of the pending MDL cases.30
Fourth, even as rules, case law, and statutes structure aggregation,
fifty years of its use has made plain that “solidarity of interest” is a
complex concept. Whether litigants are seeking injunctions to deseg-
regate schools or damages for torts, the “homogeneous character” of a
class can decline, as remedies are crafted and allocated. For critics,
disuniformity of interests, coupled with the emotive image of indi-
vidual rights to a “day in court” and the uneven successes (and, at
times, failures) of distributing remedies, have been the hooks upon
26 For more discussion of the shift in attitudes toward mass torts, see Judith Resnik,
“Vital” Interests of the State: From Collective Actions for Fair Labor Standards and Pooled
Trusts to Class Actions and MDLs in the Federal Courts, 165 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017) and Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5,
21–22 (1991) [hereinafter Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation”].
27 Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (Apr. 29, 1968), now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1407
(2012).
28 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
29 Specifically, 132,788 cases out of 341,813 pending cases were in MDLs. See U.S.
JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDIST. LITIG., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 5, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/
JPML_Statistical_Analysis_of_Multidistrict_Litigation-FY-2015_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5BDY-W9SJ]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE C-1: U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—
CIVIL CASES COMMENCED, TERMINATED, AND PENDING DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD
ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2015 (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
data_tables/C01Sep15.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UXT-YNWP] (both data sets are from the
year ending September 30). The data might be differently broken down, for example, by
carving out the large number of cases in certain MDLs (such as the seven transvaginal
mesh MDLs, with more than 70,000 cases as of 2015, in the Southern District of West
Virginia), or by comparing the length of time during which MDLs are pending, as
compared to individual cases.
30 The data are based on materials provided for use by Professor Samuel Issacharoff.
See Samuel Issacharoff, Snapshot of MDL Caseload Statistics 2 (Oct. 8, 2015)
(presentation at Duke University School of Law).





      10/19/2017   15:13:04
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\92-4\NYU409.txt unknown Seq: 10 19-OCT-17 15:01
1026 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1017
which to hang efforts to bar aggregates.31 Such arguments against class
actions are often framed as problems of due process.
Fifth, the Supreme Court’s law on personal jurisdiction needs to
be linked to discussions of class actions because the underlying con-
cerns—the legitimacy of courts’ authority to bind litigants—are par-
allel. A willingness to expand jurisdiction over non-residents was part
of the history of aggregation’s development. In 1950, in Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., when the Court approved the
authority of New York to settle accounts in pooled trusts regardless of
where beneficiaries resided, the Court did so by relaxing constraints of
personal jurisdiction law.32 As a commentator explained a year there-
after, personal jurisdiction was no longer “based on power alone”;
rather, “[f]airness to both parties” was becoming the “major
consideration.”33
The fairness approach had by then gained traction under the 1945
decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, which tasked judges
with assessing the contacts of an absent defendant to a forum sufficed
to make the exercise of jurisdiction “fair and just.”34 In more recent
decades, and despite Justice Brennan’s efforts to answer that question
by having personal jurisdiction rest on the relationships among a
forum, the litigants, the cause of action, and the defendants,35 the
Supreme Court has insisted on a narrower approach, focused on
defendants’ voluntarily affiliating with a forum.36
In the twenty-first century, participation by non-resident defen-
dants in a forum37 (described as whether a defendant is “at home” in a
particular jurisdiction38) has become the touchstone for this body of
substantive due process law. When curbing “judicial power” to hale
defendants into court,  the Court has explained its concerns as a mix
31 One example is the proposed Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017. H.R.
985, 115th Cong. (2017). The bill is discussed infra notes 185–89 and accompanying text. R
32 See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
33 Fraser, supra note 5, at 319. R
34 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
35 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299–313 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
36 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (White, J., opinion
of the Court).
37 See Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal
Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479 (1987).
38 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1776
(2017) (citations omitted); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014); Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). See generally Richard
D. Freer, Some Specific Concerns with the New General Jurisdiction, 15 NEV. L.J. 1161
(2015).
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of the need to respect other states’ “sovereignty” and “individual
liberty.”39
Due process concerns about affiliations between litigants and
courts can also be found in the law governing non-resident class action
members. The Supreme Court’s 1985 ruling in Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Shutts insisted on a nexus between absent plaintiffs seeking dam-
ages and the courts that would rule on their rights in the aggregate.40
However, unlike the 1950 ruling in Mullane in which the Court held
N.Y. State had to provide notice to beneficiaries but not offer exit
rights,41 the Shutts Court concluded that the Constitution required
giving absent plaintiff class members the opportunity to exclude them-
selves. But like Rule 23(b)(3), affirmative individual consent was not
required; notice and opt-out opportunities were deemed sufficient to
mark the relationship of a court and the litigants subject to its
judgment.42
Of course, individual liberty is a central value of constitutional
law. In the context of litigation, liberty suggests autonomous decisions
to pursue legal claims, resulting in opportunities for a “day in court.”
But the data about today’s courts undermine an assumption that many
people enjoy that form of liberty. Unrepresented litigants now file
about one quarter of the civil cases in the federal trial courts,43 and
about a half of the appeals.44 A recent study by the National Center
for State Courts, reviewing some 650,000 civil cases in ten major coun-
39 In J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011), the focus was on
individual liberty. In Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780, Justice Alito’s opinion for
the Court addressed the important “territorial limitations on the power of the respective
States” (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)). The relationship between
these two ideas is explored in terms of the power of sovereigns and fairness to litigants in
Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966), and in terms of the legitimacy of the exercise of
authority in George Rutherglen, Personal Jurisdiction and Political Authority (VA. PUB.
LAW & LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH, PAPER NO. 2017-13), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2951109. In contrast, Alan Morrison has argued that, in terms of
non-resident businesses, the Court ought to approach the issues as regulated under the
Dormant Commerce Clause. See Brief for Alan B. Morrison as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, (No. 16-466) (filed Mar. 30,
2017).
40 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985).
41 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
42 Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 812–13.
43 The federal district court database details what it terms “pro se filings” back to 2005.
In each of the years analyzed at least twenty-five percent of civil cases were filed by
unrepresented plaintiffs. See Judicial Business, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, http:/
/www.uscourts.gov/report-names/judicial-business?tn=C-13&pt=All&t=All&m%5Bvalue
%5D%5Bmonth%5D=&y%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D (last visited July 24, 2017).
44 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE 2.4: U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS–PRO-SE
CASES FILED (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/table_2.04_0.pdf.
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ties, found that in more than eighty percent, one party was in court
lawyer-less.45 Middle-class and lower-class individuals are effectively
priced out of litigation, which has become a kind of “luxury” good.46
Thus, if enabling pursuit of legal claims remains an aspiration in the
American polity, aggregation—with its attenuated relationships
among courts and litigants—is an essential mode of providing cross-
litigant subsidies, and class actions are one relatively developed
method of doing so.
Sixth, whether enabling access to courts remains an aspiration is
now in question, as statutes and rules prevent the people most in need
of aggregate litigation from using it. In the 1990s, Congress prohibited
Legal Services Corporation (LSC) lawyers from bringing class actions
and placed limits on prisoner and security class actions. More recently,
the Supreme Court’s expansive reading of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) has licensed the enforcement of bans on aggregate proceedings
imposed on consumers and employees. And, as I write, a new, pro-
posed “Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017”47 would
require plaintiffs in class actions seeking monetary relief to establish
that each individual within a class “suffered the same type and scope
of injury” as did the named representative.48 The 2017 provisions also
seek to curb the use of MDL aggregation in torts.49
Looking at class actions over the course of the past fifty years
makes plain the ideological shifts in which the expansion and contrac-
tion are embedded. Rulemaking in the 1960s was infused with the res-
idue of New Deal optimism and confidence in government expertise,
and motivated by a sense of urgency about racial injustice and the
need for oversight of economic transactions. Since the 1990s, congres-
sional and judicial efforts aiming to close off class actions reflect the
ascendant ideology of deregulation, implemented in part through lim-
iting access to courts.50 Critics of aggregation argue that it conflicts
with the adversarial autonomy of American litigation, and that class
actions benefit plaintiff lawyers who exploit weak claims and extort
45 See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN
STATE COURTS 14–16, 21, 33 (2015).
46 Jonathan Lippman, Overview, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN
AMERICA xxxii (Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., 2016).
47 H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017).
48 Id. § 1716(a).
49 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
50 See generally STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND
RETRENCHMENT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017);
Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013); A.
Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to
Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441 (2013).
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settlements to the detriment of plaintiffs and of economic vitality. Pro-
ponents of aggregation in turn resist as they argue aggregation’s cen-
trality to the enforcement of common law, constitutional, and
statutory entitlements under state and federal law. Current class
action debates are predicated on these conflicting political concep-
tions of the function of courts and of the governments that deploy
them.
Seventh, in this era when conflicts center around radical eco-
nomic and racial inequalities, a pervasive unease about government
institutions, and a fierce individualism, aggregation is both essential
and in need of retooling. My hope is that class actions can be part of a
response to the tragic fracturing of social ordering. Courts hold out
promises of a respite, as their structure and rules oblige judges, as well
as disputants, to join in a civilized discourse about deeply divisive
issues. Further, they may be one of many places to build “solidarity of
interest.” The values encoded in the Due Process Clause and the First
Amendment imagine judges responding to arguments made in open
courts through a regimented process subjected to public scrutiny.
What Jeremy Bentham termed “publicity” (which he called the “soul
of justice”51) imposes discipline, permits participation, and anchors
the legitimacy of rulings, in individual and in aggregate litigation.
But a piece of that public oversight and litigant affiliation is
missing. Rule 23 and MDLs build in publicity when aggregates come
into being and when they are settled, but not thereafter. Yet class
actions do not end at settlement or trial because aggregate remedies
take time to implement. Thus, these cases have three phases: certifica-
tion, settlement, and implementation. Cases involving structural
injunctions such as civil rights and prisoner claims regularly rely on
special masters and compliance monitors and on repeated trips to
court to enforce decrees. Aggregations involving monetary relief have
likewise involved a variety of steps and actors, including escrow agents
and claims facilities. Their practices have, however, been subjected to
less public scrutiny, in part because defendants seeking closure have
few incentives to raise questions about the distribution of remedies.
Yet in some cases, only a small subset of plaintiffs recoup—either
because the time and effort required to do so are greater than the
likely recovery or the information demanded for remedies is not easily
available. Furthermore, not all of the difficulties in making disburse-
ments may be known when settlements are crafted and approved.
51 Jeremy Bentham, Draught for the Organization of Judicial Establishments,
Compared with That of the National Assembly, with a Commentary on the Same, in 4 THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 305, 316 (John Bowring ed., 1843) [hereinafter Bentham,
Organization of Judicial Establishments].
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During this third phase of aggregation, the question of whether
interests are homogeneous (which preoccupied the 1966 drafters
focused on certification and settlement) needs to be considered again.
Instead of using, as critics propose, the difficulties of implementation,
the conflicts, and low claims rates to argue against class certification, I
write to sketch ideas about how to craft processes to acknowledge the
complexities of making remedies effective. Just as the class action rule
aimed in the 1960s to provide cross-plaintiff subsidies during the pre-
judgment phases of litigation, the rule could be retooled to shape
methods of generating group-based participatory rights and public
debates during this third phase. Even if, as David Shapiro suggested,
the class is best understood as “an entity” (rather than as an aggrega-
tion of individuals) before resolution,52 the question of disaggregation
needs to be asked during the remedial phase to learn whether once
adequately represented interests diverge depending on the form relief
takes.53 Moreover, whether discord emerges or not, court oversight is
needed to ensure distributional fairness and public access to the
processes and outcomes.
Doing so requires opening the door (literally and metaphorically)
to post-resolution assessment (and sometimes readjustments) in court,
so as to forge public relationships to legitimate the authority of courts,
under which the remedial obligations were spawned. The law of per-
sonal jurisdiction relies on defendants affirmatively affiliating with a
forum and the Court has used that doctrine to contract courts’
authority. I propose borrowing the idea of litigants being “at home” in
the law of post-settlement aggregation but deploying it for the oppo-
site purpose—to expand courts’ jurisdiction by building new mecha-
nisms that maintain affiliations between litigants and the courts, and
making those ongoing relationships part of the public practices of
courts.
The result would reflect the realities of distinctions among sets of
individuals with overlapping, albeit not totally homogeneous, inter-
ests. Litigation systems bundle them together because, as one English
jurist described long ago, it is “better to go as far as possible toward
52 Shapiro, supra note 12. R
53 The focus of this essay is on procedure in the United States. But the use of aggregate
litigation elsewhere includes examples of some forms of oversight. In Australia,
distribution of funds pursuant to representative proceedings that are settled entail a court-
approved settlement distribution plan—a settlement distribution scheme (SDS)—and
some courts have developed rules on oversight. See Rebecca Gilsenan & Michael Legg,
Australian Class Action Settlement Distribution Scheme Design  (2017), http://
www.cari.unsw.edu.au/sites/cari.unsw.edu.au/files/class-action-settlement-distribution-
design-CARI-paper.pdf.
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justice than to deny it altogether.”54 The law of class and other aggre-
gate actions needs to generate connectiveness for absent litigants
throughout the phases of class actions and thereby underscore the
interdependencies of litigants and their court systems in a thriving
body politic.
II
“SOLIDARITY OF INTEREST,” “COMMON DECENCY,”
AND READING THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEA
LEAVES OF THE 1960S
Procedures had to be “devised and applied as to insure that those
present are of the same class as those absent and that the litigation is
so conducted as to insure the full and fair consideration of the
common issue.” 
—Hansberry v. Lee, 194055
Rule 23 instantiated new understandings of what due process per-
mitted. To understand its impact and to explore the role that notice
has come to play as a mechanism for legitimating court authority, I
detail some of the exchanges among the Rule’s drafters, exploring
options to expand the reach of courts through class actions.
Between 1962 and 1964, the Advisory Committee discussed what
kinds of claims were to be eligible for class treatment, the interaction
between those affected and the courts rendering judgments, the
preclusive impact of class action rulings, and the constitutional param-
eters that could affect the design of a new rule. They read the
Supreme Court’s case law to recognize the constitutionality of aggre-
gate litigation but not to direct its parameters. Shared interests were
key, but which absentees needed to know what, when, and why was
not clear. The discussions reflect that the drafters of Rule 23 had a
sense of constitutional possibilities rather than fixed constitutional
strictures. They aimed to leave a great deal to the discretion of judges,
thought able to identify which cases to certify as classes, to decide who
(if anyone) to notify, and thereafter, to determine how much preclu-
sion should result.
As Benjamin Kaplan subsequently explained in 1969, the Advi-
sory Committee drafting Rule 23 was keenly aware of the then-
growing federal dockets and of the goal of “reduc[ing the] units of
54 Duke of Bedford v. Ellis [1901] AC 8 (HL) 11 (appeal taken from Eng.). Chafee
discussed this case in his book, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, supra note 8, at 215–16. R
Chafee regularly referenced Lord Eldon as a guide to understanding representative
litigation. Id. at 204–27.
55 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940).
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litigation.”56 But the Committee also wanted, “even at the expense of
increasing litigation, to provide means of vindicating the rights of
groups of people who individually would be without effective strength
to bring their opponents into court at all.”57
Doing so entailed revamping the limits of the 1938 version of
class actions with its three categories distinguishing “true,” “hybrid,”
and “spurious” class actions—delineations that had become mired in
case law struggling to decide the impact of a first class action lawsuit
on those pursuing further litigation. The Reporters’ memorandum
accompanying a “Tentative Proposal” in 1962 suggested abandoning
those categories altogether. By focusing on the “character of the
right,” cases would be identified in which “solidarity of interest among
class members” was strong enough that their interests could be “ade-
quately and faithfully represented.”58 Salient examples included
school desegregation cases, in which enforcement became problematic
after named-plaintiff students had graduated, as well as group-based
injuries when utility companies overcharged customers.59
The 1940 Supreme Court decision of Hansberry v. Lee,60 which
one of the 1962 Reporters’ memorandum described as “difficult” to
read,61 exemplified both the permissibility of class actions and the
uncertainty of their requirements. At issue in Hansberry was the
ability to enforce racially restrictive covenants, limiting housing to
whites in an area of Chicago by prohibiting the selling of land to “any
person of the colored race.”62 A first lawsuit (Burke v. Kleiman63) had
been brought to enforce the restrictions; based on its success in doing
56 Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969).
57 Id.
58 Tentative Proposal and Modifications Class Action, May 1962, supra note 1, at EE- R
23, EE-26 (“Summing Up”); see also Modification of Rule 23, 1963, supra note 8, at EE-15 R
to EE-19. Discussed were the insufficiency of the old categories and need for a “more
practical” rule that would “lead to a better understanding and sounder formulation by the
courts of the proper extent” of class action judgments. Id. at EE-19.
59 For a discussion on the Committee members’ concerns for civil rights litigants, see
Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” supra note 26, at 14, 47 and in David Marcus, R
Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class
Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 705 (2011). As for consumers, the Reporters’ memos cited
repeatedly Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 195 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1951), which
involved illegal rate increases involving 175,000 consumers obtaining gas from Washington
Gas Light Company. The Reporters’ memos discussed the district court’s imposition of
interest payments (which were reversed), and the set-aside under the common benefit
theory for the lawyers who brought the case. See Class Actions—Some Further Thoughts
1962, supra note 1, at 5. R
60 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
61 Tentative Proposal and Modifications Class Action, May 1962, supra note 1, at EE- R
22 to EE-23.
62 Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 37.
63 277 Ill. App. 519 (1934).
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so, the Illinois Supreme Court held in 1939 in the Hansberry litigation
that Burke precluded a new lawsuit by blacks seeking to purchase
homes.64
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, ruling that closing the courts
to the Hansberry plaintiffs denied them due process.65 Noting that
representative litigation was an exception to the requirements of
being “made a party by service of process,”66 the Court commented
that individuals could be bound either through adequate representa-
tion or through participation.67 The Burke representatives had inter-
ests that were “not necessarily or even probably the same as those
whom they are deemed to represent.”68 Thus, the new black plaintiffs
were not bound by the outcome of the lawsuit filed by white propo-
nents of the restrictions.
As Jay Tidmarsh has since explained, Hansberry established “the
constitutional floor for all class actions, state or federal: class repre-
sentatives must ‘adequately represent’ absent class members.”69 But
what constitutes “adequacy” remains a source of debate. Justice
Stone’s decision for the Court noted two sources that would make
representation adequate and hence legitimate: a unity of interests or
participation. If those conditions were met (as that 1962 Rule 23
memo explained when quoting from the decision), the Hansberry
Court thought binding absentees permissible.70 If “the rights of its
members” turned on “a single issue of fact or law,” a state could
create procedures that would be preclusive of subsequent litigation.71
What was required (as quoted in this Section’s epigraph) were proce-
dures “devised and applied as to insure that those present are of the
same class as those absent and that the litigation is so conducted as to
insure the full and fair consideration of the common issue.”72
64 Lee v. Hansberry, 372 Ill. 369 (1939).
65 Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 45.
66 Id. at 40.
67 Id. at 42–43.
68 Id. at 45. Facts appearing central to the holding—such as that only fifty-four percent
of the owners of the footage had signed the restrictive covenants—have not been
substantiated. A search of land records suggests a much higher number of signatories. Jay
Tidmarsh, The Story of Hansberry: The Rise of the Modern Class Action, in CIVIL
PROCEDURE STORIES 233, 263–70 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter
Tidmarsh, The Story of Hansberry].
69 Tidmarsh, The Story of Hansberry, supra note 68, at 275. R
70 Tentative Proposal and Modifications Class Action, May 1962, supra note 1, at EE- R
11.
71 Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 43.
72 Id. at 43. These passages are cited in Tentative Proposal and Modifications Class
Action, May 1962, supra note 1, at EE-11. R
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What then were “procedures” that sufficed? The 1962 memo
noted that it was “possible to interpret Hansberry as giving the matter
of notice an independent significance (as well as the probative force
. . . on the question of adequate representation),” but the memo did
not endorse that position because Hansberry had not directly
addressed notice. Instead, the Reporters’ suggestion was to leave the
decision on the “character and timing” of notice “to the discretion of
the judge on the firing line.”73
When discussing what courts ought to tell individuals whose
rights were to be determined, the Reporters repeatedly referenced the
1950 volume Some Problems in Equity, by Zechariah Chafee, Jr., who
reviewed a host of examples of “representative suits” and called for
revision of then-current federal practice.74 Chafee described English
judges who “had no hesitation in jumping, not only the obstacle of
unjoined parties, but also the obstacle of binding them without a day
in court,” so long as the representatives “fairly and honestly” dealt
with the “general questions at issue and [did] not betray the interests
of their many absent associates.”75
But, as Chafee explained, in the United States, one had to “worry
about the ‘due process’ clause” and, therefore, to consider whether it
was “arbitrary to bind persons who never had notice or a chance to be
heard . . . .”76 Chafee noted that, while “old process” was “due pro-
cess” for the English,77 the U.S. Supreme Court had imposed more
constraints, but he also cited examples when it too had ignored notice
and had bound absentees.78 For example, in the 1921 decision of
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, the Court had held that Indiana
citizens were bound by a reorganization plan benefitting tens of
thousands and relied on the conceit that they could have intervened
under the doctrine of ancillary federal court jurisdiction.79 Chafee’s
bottom line was to distinguish the constitutionally required “due pro-
cess” from what he termed “fairness.” As he understood it, while
“unnamed members of a class” might “have no constitutional rights”
to notice or participation, nonetheless “considerations of fairness”
remained.80
73 Tentative Proposal and Modifications Class Action, May 1962, supra note 1, at EE- R
11 to EE-12; see also Modification of Rule 23, 1963, supra note 8, at EE-37. (“[T]he court R
is to decide the matter of notice in the exercise of its sound discretion . . . .”).
74 See CHAFEE, supra note 8, at 205–85. R
75 Id. at 212–13.
76 Id. at 225.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 226–27 (citing Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 16 How. 288 (1853)).
79 Id. at 227–29 (citing 255 U.S. 356 (1921)).
80 Id. at 230.
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Thus, when sorting out what to recommend for the 1960s class
action revisions, the Reporters invoked Chafee’s concerns about law-
suits that “seriously affect[ed]” the financial interests of individuals
who were not notified about the litigation; they quoted Chafee:
“Surely, in the future, common decency requires some sort of steps to
be taken to apprise people that litigation is under way” when they had
financial stakes in the outcome.81 Chafee called for
courts to work out some kind of machinery to inform unnamed per-
sons about their predicament. Of course, formal notice is out of the
question; that would defeat the chief advantage of a class suit. Yet
there ought to be something—perhaps postcards, perhaps an adver-
tisement on the financial page of the New York Times.82
Doing “something” thus had appeal to the 1960s drafters, even as it
entailed inventing a new form of notice, short of formal process.83 Yet
doing “something” was also a source of concern; some members of the
Civil Rules Advisory Committee thought that providing information
about pending lawsuits would give rise (in an era when lawyer adver-
tising was prohibited) to solicitation of clients.84
Another 1962 memo, offering “Some Further Thoughts,” again
raised notice, described as especially important for the draft’s formu-
lation of what would later become today’s (b)(3) classes: “if a satisfac-
tory manner of giving notice is employed, it seems likely that the
requirements of the due process clause will be satisfied.”85 And in yet
another exchange, again quoting Chafee, a memo reiterated that
“common decency” entailed taking some “steps” to let those affected
by a litigation know that it was “under way.”86
Today’s readers could easily assume that Mullane was a major
case regularly invoked when Rule 23 was drafted in the 1960s. Indeed,
a citation to the decision sits in the 1966 Advisory Note to Rule
23(d)(2) along with Hansberry as part of a string of cases standing for
the proposition that the “mandatory notice” for (b)(3) classes “is
designed to fulfill requirements of due process to which the class
action procedure is of course subject.”87 But the 1962 memo that had
discussed Hansberry at length mentioned Mullane only in a footnote
81 Id.
82 Id. at 231.
83 Tentative Proposal and Modifications Class Action, May 1962, supra note 1, at EE- R
11 n.5.
84 See Class Actions—Some Further Thoughts 1962, supra note 1, at 11–13 (responding R
in part to committee member John Frank’s concerns).
85 Id. at 9.
86 Modification of Rule 23, 1963, supra note 8, at EE-5; Tentative Proposal and R
Modifications Class Action, May 1962, supra note 1, at EE-9. R
87 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(2) Advisory Committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
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to the comment that notice could potentially have “independent sig-
nificance . . . in determining whether a class action binding outsiders
comports with due process.”88 That memo also explained that a
“failure to inform members of the class may mean in some cases that a
judgment purporting to bind the class violates the due process clause
(and therefore will be denied full faith and credit).”89
Notice has since taken center stage, in part because of the
Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,90
which insisted that plaintiffs pay for notice provided personally to
individual class members and which relied heavily on the 1950 deci-
sion of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.91 Moreover,
Mullane became the touchstone in another line of cases, elaborating
procedural due process requirements in many contexts. From the 1970
decision in Goldberg v. Kelly to more recent rulings on homeowners’
forfeiture, the Court has regularly invoked the formula of notice and
an opportunity to be heard.92 Therefore, the role that notice played in
Mullane itself requires elaboration here.
The backdrop of the Mullane case was legislation enacted by New
York in 1937 to give banks permission to pool individual trusts to insu-
late banks from a host of potential claimants.  The statute authorized
banks to seek a kind of declaratory action to obtain judicial affirma-
tion that they had properly discharged their fiduciary duties when
managing and distributing assets of all the trusts’ beneficiaries.93 The
statute creating the aggregation in Mullane did not rely (as the Illinois
class action provision at issue in Hansberry had) on one person
standing in for others, similarly situated. Rather, judges were to
appoint outsiders as guardians ad litem to represent interests that they
did not personally share. The point was to lower administrative costs
88 Tentative Proposal and Modifications Class Action, May 1962, supra note 1, at EE- R
10 to EE-11 n.4. Mullane is also mentioned once in the eighteen page memorandum,
“Class Actions—Some Further Thoughts,” in that “jurisdiction by necessity” coupled with
“adequate notice” was what Mullane’s “rationale” seemed to support. Class Actions—
Some Further Thoughts 1962, supra note 1, at 9. It is also cited in Modification of Rule 23, R
1963, to support the proposition that “the fact that adequate advance notice would have
been given to members of the class, with specific opportunity to take steps for their own
protection consistent with the fair and efficient conduct of the action, would fulfill the
requirements of due process.” Modification of Rule 23, 1963, supra note 8, at EE-35. R
89 Tentative Proposal and Modifications Class Action, May 1962, supra note 1, at EE- R
11.
90 417 U.S. 156 (1974). The ruling was seen as profoundly undermining Rule 23. See
Kenneth W. Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 97.
91 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
92 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see also Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220
(2006); Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002).
93 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 100-c (1937) (repealed 1986; codified as revised at N.Y.
BANKING LAW § 100-c (2008)).
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for beneficiaries as well as for banks and to expand investment
options, while closing off the potential for an array of claims.94 The
law of res judicata would block unhappy beneficiaries from subse-
quently being able to allege imprudence.95
In its 1937 enactment, the New York Legislature required that
notice of the process for settling accounts be put into the initial trust
documents provided to beneficiaries and, when banks filed actions, to
place notices of the settling of accounts in selected newspapers.96 The
1950 Supreme Court ruling in Mullane approved, in large measure,
the ability of New York to adjudicate the rights of all the beneficiaries
and thereby permitted what today we call nationwide jurisdiction.
To do so, the Court rejected relying on distinctions between “in
personam” and “in rem” jurisdiction, which had been regular compo-
nents of the law of personal jurisdiction. The Court authorized state
courts to bind individuals outside their physical boundaries, if partici-
pating in trusts that were within those boundaries, as doing so was
part of the state’s control over the trust and its beneficiaries.97 The
“interest of each state in providing means to close trusts” created
under its laws was “so insistent” that it was “beyond doubt the right of
its courts to determine the interests of all claimants, resident or non-
resident, provided its procedure accords full opportunity to appear
and be heard.”98
But the Mullane decision is also famous for calling on banks to
find individuals so as to provide notice to the absentees whose prop-
erty interests were affected.99 Yet not everyone had to be located. Jus-
94 The banking lobby pressed for New York to enact the statute. As Justice Jackson
explained, “[m]ounting overheads have made administration of small trusts undesirable to
corporate trustees.” Mullane, 339 U.S. at 307.
95 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 100-c (repealed 1986; codified as revised at N.Y. BANKING
LAW § 100-c (2008)). Several other states authorized pool trusts without creating this form
of accounting. John Leubsdorf, Unmasking Mullane: Due Process, Common Trust Funds,
and the Class Action Wars, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1693, 1708 (2015).
96 N.Y. LAWS 1937, c. 687; N.Y. BANKING LAW § 100-c(12). In the Central Hanover
accounting proceedings, Kenneth Mullane was designated to represent what was
functionally one subclass, the inter-vivos beneficiaries, and James Vaughn was assigned the
testamentary beneficiaries. Mullane had argued that, without notice sent directly to more
beneficiaries, a bank would use pooled trusts “as a dumping ground for its own shaky and
depreciated securities.” Appellant’s Brief at 26, Mullane, 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (No. 378),
1950 WL78701 (quoting 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 430, 435). Vaughn did not object to
the provision.
97 As one commentator explained in 1950, since the jurisdiction was neither in rem nor
in personam, “a court must be exercising a third type of jurisdiction.” Fraser, supra note 5, R
at 311.
98 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313.
99 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 312–13, 320. The Court identified two forms of property
interests: the “rights to have the trustee answer for negligent or illegal impairments” and
the risk of a “diminution” in their funds through an “allowance of fees and expenses to one
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tice Jackson read due process as not imposing “impossible or
impractical obstacles” to producing a decision about the banks’ pru-
dence, even as it required an “opportunity” for those affected to know
so as to be able to present objections.100 For those beneficiaries whose
names were “at hand” and “easily” available on the bank’s books,
notice was to be sent; for those unknown or for whom the costs of
identification were too high, publication would suffice.101
Once again, interest representation was central; “notice reason-
ably certain to reach most of those interested in objecting is likely to
safeguard the interests of all, since any objections sustained would
inure to the benefit of all.”102 Indeed, the Court noted that an “indi-
vidual interest does not stand alone but was identical with that of a
class”; everyone shared interests in “the integrity of the fund and the
fidelity of the trustee.”103
The Court thus created a communication scheme, but the further-
ance of individual autonomy was not at its core. The notice required
by Mullane did not require New York State to offer exit rights. While
objectors might be able to raise problems, no one could—upon receipt
of the notice—decline to participate (or, in today’s words, “opt out”).
These property holders were placed in what came to be called a
mandatory class. Further, the individually small stakes made
responses unlikely, especially from people living outside the state.
Indeed, in the decades thereafter, neither recorded challenges by ben-
eficiaries nor successful challenges by guardians ad litem have been
located104—prompting the question of whether notice in the pooled
trust context has an impact on those transactions.105 Thus, even as
Mullane seems to epitomize the “homogeneous character of the
claim” that the 1966 Rule drafters saw a decade later as the central
justification for aggregate litigation, “something” more than New
York State’s pro forma publication requirement was needed to legiti-
mate the exercise of courts’ power over absentees.
who, in their names but without their knowledge, may conduct a fruitless or
uncompensatory contest.” Id. at 313.
100 Id. at 313–14. The reminder for those steeped in contemporary state action
requirements applied to the Fourteenth Amendment is that the dispute was between
private parties, enlisting the state courts to settle the accountings.
101 Id. at 319.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Leubsdorf, supra note 95, at 1729. R
105 See John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or
Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 970–76 (2005). Issues include whether the requirements
have impact on the market or on how investments are made or distributed.
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What the notice requirement has done is to put both disputants
and courts to work in sending out the information that forces the fact
of the pendency of a case into the public realm and into the homes of
millions of people. Therefore, the metric by which to judge the inno-
vations of Mullane is not the numbers of objections filed in pooled
trust accountings but its impact on what today we call transparency.
States, banks, and courts had authority to bind absentees, but they
cannot exercise that authority invisibly. Notice has put not only the
banks’ work on display; it has also brought into focus the role played
by lawyers and courts.
The result, to borrow from Jeremy Bentham, was “publicity”; by
giving the public a role in observing “Judge & Co.” (to wit, lawyers),
courts provided education about what they did as well as enabled the
“tribunal of public opinion” to evaluate their work.106 And, of course,
Mullane demonstrated what the Hansberry Court had suggested: a
constitutional path to large-scale resolutions by courts whose legiti-
macy to bind absentees rested on a public process in which a subset
were informed that their interests were being determined through a
representative structure that gave them no exit rights.
Return then to the 1962–1964 drafting period to think about what
relationships among class members and courts were then in the offing.
Reflecting Mullane’s structure, in 1962, the memos to the Advisory
Committee did not assume that class members had an “absolute right
to opt out.”107 Yet notice could be useful, for along with “adequate
representation,” notice could assuage “doubts about the constitution-
ality of the representative procedure.”108 But the drafters were also
aware that notice might not have produced much of a response (as the
subsequent track record in pooled trusts later revealed). In the 1962
“further reflections” memo, the question was raised about “how much
‘individual freedom’ each member of the class in fact has . . . . [T]he
106 JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence (1827), in 6 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 351, 22, 327 (John Bowring, ed., 1843); see also Fred Cutler, Jeremy
Bentham and the Public Opinion Tribunal, 63 PUB. OPINION Q. 321, 321 (1999).
107 The discussion of an “absolute right to ‘opt out’” appeared later, and was described
in the 1964 memo by Kaplan and Sacks. See Benjamin Kaplan & Al Sacks, (A) Discussion
of Responses to Memorandum of December 2, 1963; (B) Recommendation That the
Amendment as Revised Be Promptly Circulated to the Public for Comment and Criticism
at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted), microformed on CIS No. CI-7003-08. In the 1964
memo, they concluded that judges ought to instead decide whether class members’
“inclusion [was] essential to fair and efficient adjudication” and to state reasons for
inclusion or exclusion. Id. at 5 (emphasis in the original). But the final Rule in 1966
provided opt-outs without judicial permission. See also Tentative Proposal and
Modifications Class Action, May 1962, supra note 1, at EE-12 (“We prefer in general . . . to R
leave the question of notice . . . to the discretion of the judge . . . .”).
108 Class Actions—Some Further Thoughts 1962, supra note 1, at 10. R
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pressure for submitting” and “to be bound . . . by a ‘model’ trial
[would] often be so high” as to constitute “compulsion.”109 That
memo also noted that individuals did not have a “meaningful” interest
in pursuing an individual lawsuit if “a single district [was] obviously
and pre-eminently the most convenient forum.”110 In short, rather
than focusing on enabling individual litigants to make autonomous
decisions to file their own lawsuits, the drafters sought to generate
some kind of connection between courts and absent litigants.
The sense that notice might not be a necessity was related to the
drafters’ views on preclusion which, today, may also sound unex-
pected. The Reporters’ early memos did not assume that symmetry—
between winning and losing plaintiffs and defendants in class
actions—was required, nor did the memos presuppose that all subse-
quent litigation was barred.111 Rather, the 1962 memos noted that
class actions could be designed to have a one-way binding effect,
enforceable against defendants but not preclusive of new rights for
plaintiffs—for example, if “the law changes favorably to the asserted
civil rights.”112 While “‘two-way’ binding effect should be the norm,”
judges might have discretion, after the fact, to identify “special consid-
erations” that would not bar plaintiffs from bringing new cases.113
Chafee had also suggested that judges in class proceedings could
insert “a statement in the judgment” about its bindingness, even if it
would not be “conclusive” upon a later court.114 And Hansberry was
cited for the proposition that judgments could be “open to reexamina-
tion” to assess whether members of the class were “adequately repre-
sented,” which turned on whether their interests were “unitary.”115
109 Id.
110 Id. at 11.
111 Modification of Rule 23, 1963, supra note 8, at EE-7, EE-32 to EE-35 (proposed R
note). Those views reflect the influence of the Kalven and Rosenfield article, The
Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, which had argued in 1941 that if a class
representative won, absentees should be able to benefit even if they were not to be bound
by a loss. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the
Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1941). The idea of “one-way binding” class actions was
also discussed in the “Class Actions—Some Further Thoughts” memo in the context of
Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 195 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1951), discussed supra note 1. R
The comment was that, if the consumer plaintiff had lost, “other consumers would
presumably have been free to try again.” Class Actions—Some Further Thoughts 1962,
supra note 1, at 6. R
112 Tentative Proposal and Modifications Class Action, May 1962, supra note 1, at EE- R
27.
113 Id. at EE-30, EE-31.
114 Chafee, supra note 8, at 294. R
115 Tentative Proposal and Modifications Class Action, May 1962, supra note 1, at EE-
10.
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By 1964, different parameters had emerged. The idea of one-way
class preclusion had been dropped. The proposal stated that a class
action judgment “shall extend by its terms to the members of the class,
as defined, whether or not the judgment is favorable to them.”116 Fur-
ther, the Advisory Committee’s published draft circulated for com-
ment in 1964 required “reasonable notice” for all members of (b)(3)
classes and implied that individual notice (what the draft called “spe-
cific notice”) needed to be provided to only a small subset—“each
member known to be engaged in a separate suit on the same subject
matter with the party opposed to the class.”117 Moreover, exclusion
was not then as-of-right; it was presumptively available but judges
were given the power to overrule individual efforts to exit. The 1964
version directed that “the court shall exclude those members who, by
a date to be specified, request exclusion, unless the court finds that
their inclusion is essential to the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy and states its reasons therefore.”118
The reminder is that, as promulgated in 1966, Rule 23 did not
mandate notice for its (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes of the pendency of the
class action at the outset.119 Further, while it called for notice if a dis-
missal or “compromise” were in the offing,120 Rule 23 did not detail
the kind, quality, or comprehensiveness of that notice. The notice that
was required for (b)(3) classes after certification invoked Mullane’s
standard of “best practicable under the circumstances,”121 which
might well have been read to require less than what the Court con-
cluded in Eisen to mandate.122 Indeed, given that Rule 23 does not
116 Rule 23(c)(2), Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil
Procedure for the United States District Courts, 34 F.R.D. at 325, 386 (1964).
117 Id.
118 Id. The version of the rule printed in a memo by Kaplan and Sacks used the spelling
“therefor.” Kaplan & Sacks, supra note 107, at 4. R
119 Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, Supplemental Rules for Certain
Admiralty and Maritime Claims, and Rules of Criminal Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 97 (1966).
In 2003, amendments to the Rule expressly authorized district judges to use their discretion
to require notice for b(1) and b(2) class members. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (2003
amendments).
120 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. at 98.
121 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) Advisory Committee’s note to the 1966 amendment. In
a comment, Lawrence Fox thoughtfully detailed how the 1966 Rule had not answered
“important questions” related to notice—what it entailed and who paid for it, “whenever”
it was required. See Lawrence Fox, Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice and the
New Class Action Rule: Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA.
L. REV. 889, 905–15 (1968).
122 See Dam, supra note 90, at 109–16. Justice Powell’s opinion for the Court in Eisen R
did not make clear why so much time and money had to be spent on seeking out
individuals as contrasted with the sampling that the district judge’s notice order had put
into place to obtain representatives from whatever diverse interests existed. The district
court had found plaintiffs were likely to succeed in establishing the violations of anti-trust
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require notice for (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes, the Eisen decision is best
read as an interpretation of Rule 23 itself and not of the Due Process
Clause.123
But by the time the Court had decided Eisen, it had also ruled in
Goldberg v. Kelly that notice and an opportunity to be heard were
constitutionally obliged when the property rights of recipients of
public benefits were terminated.124 The distinction that Chafee had
drawn in 1950 between U.S.-style constitutional due process and “fair-
ness” was evaporating, as fairness was increasingly the metric by
which the Court judged the adequacy of adjudication, whether in
administrative bodies or in courts.125
The Court’s attachment to notice and its imposition of other
restrictions on class actions should also be read in relationship to the
Court’s recent law on personal jurisdiction. Both Eisen and the new
doctrine on personal jurisdiction make using courts more challenging,
in part by imposing costs on plaintiffs, either to provide notice to
fellow class members or to travel to defendants unless the increasingly
exacting requirements for defendants’ purposeful affiliation with a
forum have been met. Both bodies of law share a concern to identify
affiliating circumstances among litigants and courts that are sufficient
to legitimate the political authority of courts to alter rights; both  doc-
trines circumscribe the capacity of courts to address legal claims
unless such ties are evident.
A final comment about the 1960s gestalt is in order. As Kaplan
put it, the drafters were “paternalistic.”126 As reflected in my brief
summaries of the exchanges, they were also optimistic—seeking to
open up new avenues for redress. They had faith in federal judges to
identify “solidarity” of interests and then to resolve disputes to vindi-
cate those rights.127 Indeed, with Hansberry as a model, the problems
of alignment of interests seemed straightforward—as the question of
and securities laws, that the costs of individual notice for the millions of odd-lot traders
were prohibitive, and devised a method of sampling subsets and imposed the costs of doing
so on the defendants. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
rev’d, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Fox had argued that the
Advisory Committee erred in citing Mullane in support of requiring individual notice for
b(3) classes. See Fox, supra note 121, at 914–15. R
123 See generally Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 21 (1996).
124 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
125 For an overview of that development, see Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note
25, at 90–93. R
126 See Modification of Rule 23, 1963, supra note 8, at EE-6; see also Class Actions— R
Some Further Thoughts 1962, supra note 1, at 14. R
127 Tentative Proposal and Modifications Class Action, May 1962, supra note 1, at EE- R
21 to EE-25.
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being for or against restrictive covenants appeared to have but two
sides.128
That confidence in the judiciary was reflected in early versions of
Rule 23, which had two, not three, kinds of class actions. One category
(then labeled Rule 23(c)) addressed “presumptively maintainable”
class actions, and a second (under 23(d)) covered “class actions main-
tainable at the court’s discretion.”129 But in 1963, the drafters dis-
cussed whether it would be better to follow the 1938 pattern of
delineating three categories, even as they abandoned the reason (dis-
tinguishing between binding and nonbinding class actions) of the 1938
Rule for doing so.130 And, in revisions thereafter, as Benjamin Kaplan
reworked the rule to broker compromises in the Advisory Committee,
Rule 23 grew to be more directive. Yet even in its final 1966 form,
Rule 23 left a great deal of discretion to judges. The goal was to invite
litigants to use courts to resolve multi-party large-scale disputes.
III
ENABLING AND CONSTRAINING COLLECTIVITY: FROM MDL TO THE
LSC, THE PLRA, THE PSLRA, CAFA, JUDICIAL REVISION
OF THE FAA, AND THE 2017 PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL
LIMITS ON CLASS ACTIONS AND ON MDLS
“A Federal court shall not issue an order granting certification of a
class action seeking monetary relief for personal injury or economic
loss unless the party seeking to maintain such a class action affirma-
tively demonstrates that each proposed class member suffered the
same type and scope of injury as the named class representative or
representatives.”
—Proposed “Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017”131
Rule 23 was very much a part of “the 1960s” and should be read
in the context of other innovations of that time. Within a decade,
Congress opened courthouse doors for low or no-money cases by
128 See Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137
(2009); see also Tidmarsh, The Story of Hansberry, supra note 68. As the literature on R
conflicts about remedies within civil rights litigation makes clear, in some set of cases,
members of the class may—at different points within litigations—disagree. See, e.g.,
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
129 Modification of Rule 23, 1963, supra note 8, at EE-10 to EE-11. In 1950, Chafee had R
suggested two kinds, a “Solid Class Suit” and an “Invitation to Come In.” CHAFEE, supra
note 8, at 259–61, 293. R
130 Tentative Proposal and Modifications Class Action, May 1962, supra note 1, at EE-1 R
to EE-2.
131 For each subsection in H.R. 985 § 1716(a), enacted in the House of Representatives
on Mar. 9, 2017; as of this writing, the Senate referred the bill to its Judiciary Committee
on Mar. 13, 2017, where a parallel bill is likewise pending.
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authorizing funding for lawyers for impoverished civil litigants
through the creation of the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) in
1974.132 Thereafter, Congress enacted the Attorney Fee Act of 1976,
authorizing fee-shifting for victorious civil rights plaintiffs.133 When
Rule 23(b)(2) was coupled with these provisions and other fee-shifting
statutes, such as in Title VII,134 novel sets of plaintiffs made their way
into the federal courts to enforce a host of new statutory claims, regu-
lating the environment, credit, discrimination, housing, pensions, and
securities.
In the decades since, both the aspirations and the fears of the
drafters have been realized. Coupled with Mullane, Rule 23 has trans-
formed our understanding of what lawsuits can do by enabling judges
to oversee long-term school desegregation decrees and other class
actions seeking structural remedies to reform institutions such as jails,
prisons, and child care agencies.135 Further, the Rule 23 goal of pro-
viding access to low-value claimants who were, in Kaplan’s words,
“without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all”
came to fruition.136 Through the equitable doctrine permitting those
conferring a “common benefit” to recoup a percentage of the funds
recouped,137 small claims turned into potentially lucrative aggrega-
tions, enticing lawyers to take the risk of serving as “champions of
semi-public rights.”138
Across the docket, the unit of analysis shifted from “cases” to
“litigation,” and phrases like the “asbestos litigation,” the “tobacco
litigation,” (and now the “VW emissions litigation”) became common-
place.139 Those terms reflected the legitimacy of what Chafee had
called “representation by rule of law.”140 New legal relationships were
brought into being, anchoring courts’ capacity to respond to claimants
without independent means of pursuing their rights.
Moreover, class actions are but one of many ways to aggregate,
both informally and formally,141 and each form raises the question of
132 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996–2996(l) (2012).
133 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012).
134 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e(17) (2012).
135 See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the
Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980).
136 Kaplan, A Prefactory Note, supra note 56, at 497. R
137 Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the
Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 337–38 (1996).
138 Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 111, at 717. R
139 See Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” supra note 26, at 6. R
140 CHAFEE, supra note 8, at 209. R
141 Several of us have commented on these multiple forms in somewhat different
contexts. See, e.g., Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” supra note 26, at 36–39; see also R
Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805 (2011);
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“the homogenous character” of their claims. Although data on pro-
posed and pending class actions in federal courts and in agencies are
lacking,142 information on what has become a dominant form of
aggregation—cases consolidated under the 1968 MDL statute, which I
discussed at the outset143—is available. Once a panel of judges identi-
fied “one or more common questions of fact” (and hence, sufficient
“solidarity of interests”) in cases pending in different federal courts,
that panel can transfer them all to a single judge for pre-trial aggre-
gate proceedings.144
As I (and others) have detailed elsewhere,145 in 1991, fewer than
2232 cases (about one percent of the civil docket) were part of MDL
proceedings.146  By 2015, more than 130,000 filings were in 274 pro-
ceedings aggregated before a single judge, selected by the MDL
panel.147 Thus, of the 341,813 civil cases pending,148 almost forty per-
cent were part of MDLs.149 Those numbers are another tribute to the
Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action, 126
YALE L.J. 1634 (2017).
142 See Hensler, Happy 50th Anniversary, Rule 23!, supra note 11. R
143 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
144 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
145 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond the Vanishing Trial: Unrepresented
Claimants, De Facto Aggregations, Arbitration Mandates, and Privatized Processes, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 1899 (2017); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict
Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71 (2015); Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure:
Modern Multi-District Litigation’s Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 166
U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). See generally Douglas G. Smith, Resolutions of
Common Questions in MDL Proceedings, 66 KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
146 U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDIST. LITIG., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION CUMULATIVE FROM SEPTEMBER 1968 THROUGH JUNE 30,
1991, in LEGACY STATISTICS 1980–1991, at 442, 444 (1991), http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/
sites/jpml/files/Legacy_Statistical_Reports-1980-1991-Compressed_0.pdf. Data are from
year ending on June 30.
147 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (2012); U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDIST. LITIG., MDL
STATISTICS REPORT—DISTRIBUTION OF PENDING MDL DOCKETS BY DISTRICT (2015),
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Dockets_By_District-
September-15-2015.pdf. This count is affected by a few MDLs, which play a
disproportionate role in both the federal docket and the number of MDLs. One example is
cases related to vaginal mesh pelvic litigation, which were 73,080 in number. Id. Were
those mesh cases and asbestos cases—the other  disproportionate MDL, historically—not
in the mix, the federal pending cases that fall under the MDL rubric would be about 22%,
rather than almost 40%.
148 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE C-1: U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—
CIVIL CASES COMMENCED, TERMINATED, AND PENDING DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD
ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2015 (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
data_tables/C01Sep15.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UXT-YNWP]. The pending cases use the end
date of September 30, while the MDL reports on the fifteenth of each month.
149 Specifically, 132,788 cases out of the 341,813 pending cases were in MDLs. U.S.
JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDIST. LITIG., supra note 29, at 5; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. R
COURTS, TABLE C-1, supra note 29 (both data sets are from the year ending September R
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impact of Rule 23, which (along with bankruptcy filings in response to
tort and environmental claims) made commonplace the propriety of
linking together individuals sharing common factual and legal claims.
I opened this Section with a quote from The Fairness in Class
Action Litigation Act of 2017, which aims to curb MDLs as well as
class actions. That bill reflects that MDLs have now joined class
actions as objects of concern for those opposed to aggregate proceed-
ings. In earlier decades, when MDL had a smaller footprint, it did not
attract the ire leveled against Rule 23. The statute’s managerial inno-
vations were thought to respond to the administrative needs of the
courts, while Rule 23’s purposiveness in welcoming new litigants
prompted concerns. An exemplar comes from Federal District Judge
William Becker, who complained in the 1970s that the class action rule
had, from “the judicial viewpoint,” unleashed “unremitting social and
economic warfare.”150 Thus, what Arthur Miller described as a “holy
war” against class actions began soon after Rule 23’s enactment.151
That hostility has intensified, as examples of exploitation of class
action opportunities by lawyers—raised by the 1960s Advisory Com-
mittee members leery of notice—have been put forth, with accusa-
tions that the beneficiaries of class actions are lawyers, profiting at the
expense of the plaintiffs whom they purport to represent and using
class actions to leverage defendants. By the 1990s, efforts to disable
Rule 23 had come to fruition—embodied in the statutes whose initials
appear in the heading of this Section and denoting the array of activi-
ties targeted at undermining the ability to bring claims that (in
Kaplan’s words again) “otherwise would not be pressed.”152 These
enactments are a back-handed compliment, as the energy to try to
stop Rule 23 attests to its importance as a vehicle for rights-claiming
or, from the critics’ perspective, of putting defendants into the posi-
tion of having to “bet the company” if they do not settle.153
Below, I focus briefly on four methods of curtailing class actions
that cut out of court the very people, those with limited resources,
whom Rule 23 had welcomed. Two examples come from the 1996
30). As noted, supra note 147, analyses of the docket could also focus on comparing the R
percentage of MDL cases to civil cases pending a comparable length of time.
150 William H. Becker, Introduction: Use and Abuse of Class Actions Under Amended
Rule 23, 68 NW. U. L. REV. 991, 992 (1974).
151 Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and
the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 664 (1979).
152 Benjamin Kaplan, Comment on Carrington, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2126, 2127 (1989).
Kaplan’s Comment was presented as part of the Law Review’s Symposium on “The 50th
Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1938–1988.”
153 Justice Scalia used the phrase when writing the majority opinion in AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011).
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Congress, which banned class action representation by the Legal Ser-
vices Corporation and imposed new constraints on class action relief
in cases challenging prison conditions. A more recent cutback comes
by way of the Supreme Court’s expansion of the Federal Arbitration
Act through interpretations permitting enforcement of class action
bans imposed by would-be defendants. I close this section by
sketching a proposal pending as I write: the Fairness in Class Action
Litigation Act of 2017, which aims, as noted above and detailed
below, to limit not only class actions but also MDL litigation.154
Context is again needed. The restrictions on the LSC lawyers
were part of efforts (renewed in the current President’s proposed 2017
budget) to limit federal support for legal aid. The funding levels of the
LSC in 1980 provide a baseline; Congress then provided $300 million
in support. In its first decades, the LSC created backup centers, which
served as networks of coordination and communication on housing,
welfare, and consumer law, and which helped to produce a series of
class actions.155 But those efforts had to be dismantled because,
instead of keeping funding levels steady in real dollar terms (which
would translate the $300 million into $850 million by 2014156),
Congress provided only $375 million in 2014.157
In addition to scarce funds, Congress barred LSC lawyers in 1996
from initiating or participating in class actions.158 Also prohibited
were forms of legislative advocacy, handling voter redistricting claims,
initiating representation on behalf of prisoners, advocating that wel-
fare laws were unconstitutional, or requesting attorneys’ fees.159 Reg-
ulations specifically prevented LSC lawyers from working on
154 H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 105 (2017).
155 Lawrence J. Fox, Legal Services and the Organized Bar: A Reminiscence and a
Renewed Call for Cooperation, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 305 (1998).
156 Memorandum from Lisa Wood, Chair of the Am. Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on
Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, to Legal Servs. Corp. 2 (June 2, 2014), http://www.
lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/3.%20ABA-SCLAID%20FY2016%20Budget%20Rec
%20%20to%20LSC.pdf.
157 Legal Servs. Corp., 2014 Legal Services Corporation by the Numbers: The Data
Underlying Legal Aid Programs 3 (2015), http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/attach/2015/
08/LSC2014FactBook.pdf; see also Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 113-76,
tit. 4, 128 Stat. 5, 128 Stat. 76 (2014).
158 No organization that “initiates or participates in a class action suit” could receive
funds. See Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The authority for this proposition is
29 U.S.C. § 2996e(d)(5); 110 Stat. 3009 (1996); 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
159 See § 504(a), 110 Stat. at 1321–52 (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1617.3 (2016)). In 2001, the
Supreme Court held that aspects of the restrictions prohibiting advice on arguments
related to welfare law or seeking to amend welfare law were impermissible under the First
Amendment. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).





      10/19/2017   15:13:04
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\92-4\NYU409.txt unknown Seq: 32 19-OCT-17 15:01
1048 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1017
“adversarial” enforcement of final judgment and consent decrees.160
The impact of an insistence on cases filed by individuals rather than by
groups has resulted not in more “individual liberty” but in insufficient
legal services. In 2014, the LSC estimated that more than sixty-three
million Americans were eligible for its services (keyed to federal pov-
erty guidelines and permitting aid to families of four who earn $30,000
or less161), but that LSC lawyers could help only one in five of those
eligible.162
Another group of low-income litigants that Congress has targeted
are prisoners. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), enacted in
1996, was animated by an effort to “STOP” (the acronym for an ear-
lier version of the PLRA) the substantial successes that prisoners had
achieved through conditions of confinement litigation.163 The PLRA
created new work for lawyers representing prisoners, while lowering
their potential attorneys’ fees if successful.164 The PLRA encouraged
efforts to terminate litigated injunctions by requiring new fact-finding
of ongoing constitutional violations if requests were made to end
decrees.165 According to Margo Schlanger, the statute has “under-
mined prisoners’ ability to bring, settle, and win lawsuits.”166 In her
2015 update on its impact, Professor Schlanger concluded that the
PLRA had also “succeeded in radically shrinking—but not elimi-
nating—the coverage” of injunctive orders,167 in part by limiting the
“life span of new orders.”168 She mapped the decline from 1983 to
2006 in the percentage of jails (from 18% to 11%) and of prisons
160 45 C.F.R. §§ 1617.2, 1617.3 (barring LSC recipients from initiating or participating in
class actions); see also David S. Udell, The Legal Services Restrictions: Lawyers in Florida,
New York, Virginia, and Oregon Describe the Costs, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 337 (1998).
161 LEGAL SERVS. CORP., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT (2015), http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/
files/LSC/pdfs/LSC2014AnnualReport.pdf. See generally The Future of Legal Services: The
Arthur Liman Colloquium Papers, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 283 (1998).
162 FY 2016 Budget Request, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. (2016), http://www.lsc.gov/media-
center/publications/fy-2016-budget-request#bfrtoc-afy-2016-budget-request.
163 See H.R. 667, 104th Cong. (1995); Overhauling the Nation’s Prisons: Testimony
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Steve J. Martin,
General Counsel for the Texas Department of Corrections), 1995 WL 449222.
164 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997e(a), (d)(2), (d)(3), (e) (2012).
165 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), (b) (2012).
166 See Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood,
5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 153, 153 (2015) [hereinafter Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner
Litigation]; see also Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of
Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550 (2006); Margo Schlanger, Inmate
Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555 (2003).
167 Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, supra note 166, at 155. R
168 Id. at 168.
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(from 27% to 18%) in court orders, and the rarity of statewide court
orders in the twenty-first century.169
Yet this picture of constraint needs to be tempered by acknowl-
edgement of resiliency. Despite the PLRA, prisoner class actions
remain sites of doctrinal vitality, with major decisions and consent
decrees addressing solitary confinement of juveniles, the mentally ill,
and general prison conditions.170 Exemplary is the 2011 U.S. Supreme
Court ruling upholding a three-judge court order limiting the popula-
tion of California’s state prisons as an appropriate remedy under the
PLRA to combat the horrific lack of medical care that overcrowding
had produced.171
More recently, in the 2015 Ashker settlement, a class of prisoners
held in solitary confinement succeeded in reshaping California’s
“status-based” method of assigning individuals to profound isolation
and in reducing the degrees of such isolation.172 Ashker exemplifies
that even as plaintiffs have a “homogeneous” claim to end horrific
deprivations, remedying those practices entails choices about what
limits to impose on which subsets of individuals held in isolation (for
example, people who have been in for many years, or people so con-
fined because of their sentence) and about what forms of restructuring
of conditions to require (such as changing the number of hours spent
out of cell or creating transition programs for people who have been
in solitary for decades).173 To shape the remedies, lawyers needed to
work with members of the class to resolve these kinds of internal ten-
sions and potential conflicts.174
169 Id. at 169 tbl.8.
170 See, e.g., Stipulation, Parsons v. Ryan, No. CV 12-00601-PHX-DJH (D. Ariz. Oct. 14,
2014), ECF No. 1185; Settlement Agreement, Disability Rights Network of Pa. v. Wetzel,
No. 3:13-CV-00635-JEJ (M.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2015), ECF No. 59. Further, aggregation in the
context of prison reform comes in different types, from the work of the Department of
Justice’s litigation under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), class
certifications in prison condition cases, to the intensive gathering of aggregate data about
prison conditions that is used both administratively and in litigation to drive reforms. See,
e.g., ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS, AIMING TO REDUCE TIME-IN-CELL: REPORTS FROM
CORRECTIONAL SYSTEMS ON THE NUMBERS OF PRISONERS IN RESTRICTED HOUSING AND
ON THE POTENTIAL OF POLICY CHANGES TO BRING ABOUT REFORMS (2016), https://
law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/liman/document/aimingtoreducetic.pdf.
171 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
172 Settlement Agreement, Ashker v. Gov. of Cal., No. C 09-05796 CW (N.D. Cal. Sept.
1, 2015), ECF No. 424-2. CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SUMMARY OF Ashker v.
Governor of California SETTLEMENT TERMS, https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/
2015/08/2015-09-01-Ashker-settlement-summary.pdf; see also Erica Goode, Punished for
Life, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2015, at D1.
173 Examples of various reforms of solitary that are underway in California and
elsewhere are provided in Ass’n of State Corr. Adm’rs, supra note 170, at 55–72. R
174 Interview with Jules Lobel, Attorney for the Ashker Plaintiffs (Apr. 2016); see also
Jules Lobel, Comments at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law Conference on
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Another incursion into class actions comes by way of Supreme
Court interpretations of the FAA, now used to preclude employees
and consumers from joining class actions by requiring them, in job
applications and in documents related to products and services, to
waive the right to be part of an aggregate in court or in arbitration. I
and others have mapped the Court’s changing FAA case law,175
which is, as Justice O’Connor put it in the 1980s, “an edifice of its own
creation.”176 Here, I focus on the impact of class action bars. Despite
the heralding of arbitration as a speedy and effective alternative to
courts, the mass production of arbitration clauses has not resulted in a
mass of arbitrations. Instead, the number of documented individual
consumer arbitrations is startlingly small.
Arbitrations involving wireless services provide the example that
I researched because the Supreme Court addressed the legality of
bans on class arbitrations in its 2011 decision involving AT&T
Mobility177 and because data are publicly available on the number of
claims brought to arbitration. AT&T designated the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) to administer its arbitrations.
Complying with state reporting mandates to post reports on the web
reflecting five years of consumers’ use of its services, the AAA has
provided information that can be analyzed. After culling thousands of
entries between 2009 and 2014, we identified 134 individual claims
(about 27 a year) filed against AT&T.178 During that same five-
International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Prolonged Solitary Confinement (Apr.
15, 2016).
175 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration,
the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2860–93 (2015)
[hereinafter Resnik, Diffusing Disputes]; Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 25, at R
112–33; see also J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law,
124 YALE L.J. 3052 (2015).
176 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). The Court’s expansion of its own role in preemption is not unique to
arbitration cases, for “a nontextualist approach to interpretation” has gained traction. See
Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 56 (2013).
177 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).
178 The American Arbitration Association provides quarterly reports on consumer
arbitration pursuant to the laws of various jurisdictions in which it operates. Consumer
Arbitration Statistics, AM. ARB. ASS’N (2015), https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/
consumer/consumerarbstat [https://perma.cc/8ZBZ-FX5T] (select the document “Provider
Organization Report”). To review five years of data required downloading the file
documenting arbitrations from July of 2009 through June (the second quarter) of 2014 and
by filtering claims against AT&T. The data we analyzed ran from July 2009 through June of
2014. Because one law firm had filed 1149 claims in an effort to create a de facto class
action, we deleted those claims from the set and ended up identifying 134 individual claims.
Thereafter, we sent summaries and drafts of our analyses to American Arbitration
Association’s (AAA) Vice President for Statistics and In-House Research, Ryan Boyle,
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year period, AT&T had about 85 million to 120 million customers a
year.179
The absence of arbitration claims could be attributed to a lack of
a need to pursue remedies—either because customer complaints of
overcharges were met with repayments or because the company vio-
lated no laws. But that explanation is undercut by lawsuits filed by the
federal government, which charged the company (along with other
major wireless services) with a range of legal breaches, including sys-
tematic overcharging for extra services and insufficient payments of
refunds when customers complained.180
The data on the lack of use of arbitration in the wireless arena is
paralleled by findings from the federally chartered agency, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which looked at fed-
eral court filings between 2010 and 2012 in five consumer product
markets.181 The CFPB identified 3462 individual cases, or on average
about 1100 per year, in addition to 470 federal consumer class action
filings.182
Mandated arbitration is thus a misnomer because obligations to
arbitrate single-file, in practice, are rarely exercised. By reducing the
unit to an individual, disputes are not relocated but diffused and dis-
solved. No process, rather than debates about the permissible bounda-
ries of due process, is the result, which elsewhere I argued should be
read as unconstitutionally depriving individuals of their property
interests in litigation.183
who provided materials on AAA’s data and policies. More details on the methodology are
in Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 175, at 2900–15. R
179 Number of AT&T Wireless Subscribers from 2007 to 2014 (in 1,000s), STATISTA
(2015), http://www.statista.com/statistics/220692/number-of-atundt-wireless-subscribers-
since-2007 [http://perma.cc/PU6N-FTP4]; 4Q 2014 AT&T by the Numbers, AT&T (2014),
http://www.att.com/Common/about_us/pdf/att_btn.pdf [http://perma.cc/3CEP-YPER].
180 See, e.g., Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 3–4,
FTC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-3227 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/
es/system/files/documents/cases/141008attcmpt1.pdf [http://perma.cc/FK95-6AEX];
Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 16, FTC v. AT&T
Mobility, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-3227-HLM (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/es/
system/files/documents/cases/141008attstip2.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z4D3-JQTB].
181 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS,
PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a)
(2015) [hereinafter CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY], http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/P5B9-JPSZ].
182 Id. § 6, at 27–28. Filings ought not to be equated with decisions, as in some of the
cases identified, defendants sought to stay litigation and filed motions to require
arbitration. Id. § 6, at 8. Although CFPB researchers also sought to identify filings in a
subset of states, they found that data challenges made that plan unworkable. Id. § 6, at 15.
183 See Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 175, at 2810, 2823, 2936–39. R
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Disaggregation, and hence diffusion of claims of right, are also
the goals of new efforts to disable class actions, put forth in the
Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017.184 Some of its features
are familiar from prior bills, but this proposal has a wider lens: aiming
to curb “abuses” in both class actions and “mass tort litigation.”185
The justification is that such abuses are “undermining the integrity of
the U.S. legal system.”186
To do so, as this Section’s epigraph reflects, the bill would not
permit class certification of cases “seeking monetary relief for per-
sonal injury or economic loss” unless a proposed class representative
“affirmatively demonstrates that each proposed class member suf-
fered the same type and scope of injury” as did the named representa-
tive.187 Further, at the time of certification, the proponents of class
actions would have to demonstrate “that there is a reliable and admin-
istratively feasible mechanism” to determine who falls within the class
and to distribute remedies to a “substantial majority” if money is
sought.188 H.R. 985 also seeks to amend the MDL statute by requiring
counsel for plaintiffs joining an MDL to “demonstrate that there is
evidentiary support” of the factual contentions related to the injuries
alleged within 45 days of a transfer.189 In addition, attorneys cannot
receive fee awards until distribution has occurred and data on that




“[T]he vital interest of the State in bringing any issues as to its fiduci-
aries to a final settlement can be served only if interests or claims of
individuals who are outside of the State can somehow be determined.
A construction of the Due Process Clause which would place impos-
sible or impracticable obstacles in the way could not be justified.” 
—Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 1950191
I have mapped revisions in the understandings of due process
that expanded the aegis of courts,  as well as the efforts to retrench,
often argued as appropriate reflections of due process obligations to
184 H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017).
185 H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 102(2) (2017). As of this writing, the proposed legislation is
pending.
186 Id.
187 Id. § 103(a).
188 Id.
189 Id. § 105(i).
190 Id.
191 339 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1950).
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process claims individually. In this Section, I focus on the potential to
put due process to work again—not in service of contracting aggregate
litigation but as a rubric under which law could recognize and struc-
ture relationships among courts, litigants, and the public to legitimate
what I think should be understood as the third phase of aggregate
litigation, which takes place after courts have approved or the parties
have agreed upon a resolution that entails further action.
Rule 23, circa 1966, recognized that the interests of groups dealt
with in the aggregate are not fixed over the lifespan of a litigation. The
1966 Rule 23 required judges to interrogate the homogeneity of inter-
ests at the time of certification and then to return to that question at
settlement. Amendments in 2003 expanded the role of judges at certi-
fication and at settlement by charging them with appointing counsel
for the class, by outlining rules for the award of attorneys’ fees, and by
enlarging the possibilities for interlocutory appeals.192 A robust body
of law from district and appellate courts bears testament to courts’
efforts to discharge these obligations.
But Rule 23 falls silent thereafter. As currently drafted, the Rule
places no obligations for judges to oversee aggregation’s third phase,
during which remedies provided through settlements are imple-
mented, so as to respond to disputes if they arise and to require public
accountings of what transpires. Below, I sketch reasons to be con-
cerned about this third phase. I discuss debates in the literature about
the nature and scope of implementation problems and the responses
proffered in Congress and by proposed revisions of Rule 23 drafted by
the current Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. I conclude by out-
lining ways to articulate roles for disputants, judges, and the public.
Turn first to the problems. When arguing decades ago that judges
had a special role in public law litigation,193 Abram Chayes famously
delineated concerns about their work in such polycentric configura-
tions.194 Yet as Theodore Eisenberg and Stephen Yeazell explained
thereafter, these sprawling, multi-party remedial schemes were not
novelties of the 1970s; rather they were “ordinary” aspects of the
work of courts, which historically had dealt with the distribution of
estates, bankruptcies, and railroad reorganizations and therefore had
to oversee ongoing interactions among diverse parties. What was
“extraordinary” was not the role of the judge but the changing faces
of the plaintiffs; school children, prisoners, and welfare benefi-
192 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g), (h), (f), reprinted in 215 F.R.D. 158 (2003).
193 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281 (1976).
194 The term is associated with the famous essay by Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits
of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394–404 (1978).





      10/19/2017   15:13:04
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\92-4\NYU409.txt unknown Seq: 38 19-OCT-17 15:01
1054 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1017
ciaries—in addition to railroads, corporations, and wealthy individ-
uals—were making their way into court.195
How do we know so much about the challenges of structural liti-
gation, such as school desegregation and prison reform? Conflicts
about implementation became vivid in the public law cases that
Chayes wrote about because recalcitrant defendants were reluctant to
desegregate schools, abide by health standards for prisoners, or
enforce new rights to hearings before social benefits were terminated.
In response, structural injunctions spawned an array of auxiliary per-
sonnel, working as special masters and compliance monitors, to try to
put remedies into place. Further, when defendants sometimes sought
to revise consent decrees, and when plaintiffs sought enforcement,
those lawsuits returned to court. Hundreds of published opinions
make public these conflicts.
Further, in 1992, the Supreme Court authorized a relaxed stan-
dard for governments seeking modifications of decrees and thereby
marked a wider path to bring cases, after settlement, back to court.196
Judges had then to decide either to adhere to or modify prior
decrees.197 In addition, because the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1996 authorized an array of individuals to challenge the need for
continuing court authority, injunctions related to prison conditions
could be in court every two years for new fact-finding to sustain the
decrees entered.198
Liberal intervention in other cases enabled what Stephen Yeazell
described as a “social process,” permitting the involvement of a
variety of participants, some of whose interests only arose after settle-
ment.199 Thus, even as judges took up managerial roles superintending
the implementation of remedies in structural injunctions, much of that
195 Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 135, at 486–95. R
196 The first such decision announcing the new standard was Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992). See also Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009).
197 For example, the litigation about the Texas prison system spanned more than three
decades and resulted in dozens of decisions. An overview comes from the presiding judge.
See William Wayne Justice, The Origins of Ruiz v. Estelle, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1990).
Examples of some of the last set of decisions include Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265
(S.D. Tex. 1980); Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Ruiz v. United
States, 243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001); Ruiz v. Johnson, 154 F. Supp. 2d 975 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND
THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (1998); LARRY
W. YACKLE, REFORM AND REGRET: THE STORY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN
THE ALABAMA PRISON SYSTEM (1989).
198 See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
199 Stephen C. Yeazell, Intervention and the Idea of Litigation: A Commentary on the
Los Angeles School Case, 25 UCLA L. REV. 244, 258 (1977).
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work was undertaken through court proceedings that gave the public
opportunities for insights into the conflicts and resolutions.200
Cases involving monetary relief have also generated post-settle-
ment structures, focused on implementing remedies for consumers,
employees, and tort plaintiffs. In some instances (securities litigation
provides an exemplar), the records of sales and losses may be readily
accessible, and technology can lower the transaction costs of dis-
bursing sums. But other kinds of cases have prompted the creation of
a retinue of auxiliary actors and institutions—escrow agents, trustees,
and claims facilities—to facilitate distribution. That work ranges from
insurance-company-like activities of paying claims to providing dis-
pute resolution services when disputes arise about those claims.
Yet these actors have been less visible than have those working
post-settlement in school and prison cases. In part, the relative invisi-
bility comes from the incentives of the litigants. Defendants have
interests in keeping whatever “peace” has been achieved and there-
fore not to press for renewed court intervention. Plaintiffs’ lawyers
also want to hold onto deals, and they sometimes enter into agree-
ments to persuade their individual clients to accept the settlements
negotiated by lead counsel from afar.201 Judges likewise have reasons
to bring these sprawling disputes to closure. Indeed, as reflected in the
disagreement on the Supreme Court about the wisdom of large-scale
settlements in the asbestos litigation, many participants view some
kind of resolution as better than none.202 Moreover, and unlike struc-
tural injunctions, if problems emerge about distribution that were not
knowable at the time of settlement, claimants do not have a recog-
nized route back to court.
What we do not know are the dimensions of the problems of
implementation, nor how frequent are the conflicts, even as com-
peting claims about the “data” have been proffered. For example, in
2013, a law firm produced what it termed an “empirical study” of con-
200 In addition to the expanded role, post-trial, judges also developed a less visible role
as managers and settlers before decisions were rendered. See Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
201 See Lynn A. Baker, Mass Torts and the Pursuit of Ethical Finality, 85 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1943, 1944 (2017); Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions,
FORDHAM L. REV. 951 (2014).
202 Justice Breyer explained these concerns in his dissent in Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 631–34 (Breyer, J., dissenting). His vantage point was akin to that
of Lord Eldon, quoted by Chafee as having argued centuries ago that it was “better . . . to
go as far as possible toward justice than to deny it altogether.” Chafee, supra note 8, at  205
(citing Duke of Bedford v. Ellis [1901] A.C. 8 (HL) 11 (appeal taken from Eng.), which in
turn quoted Cockburn v. Thompson, 26 Ves. 321, 329 (1809), written by Lord Eldon.
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sumer and employee class actions.203 Relying on an odd-lot set of 148
federal cases (which social scientists would not call a “sample”), which
were filed in 2009 and closed in 2013, the law firm argued that class
actions created few benefits to individual plaintiffs.204 After excluding
settlements with automatic distributions (which had accounted for
thirteen of the forty cases identified as settled205), the report’s
“bottom line” from the culled cases was that class actions did “not
provide class members with anything close to the benefits claimed by
their proponents.”206 The report argued that “for practical purposes,”
lawyers were “the only real beneficiaries of the class actions.”207
That report was promptly met with counter-interpretations as
well as compilations of statistics based on other cases. The National
Association of Consumer Advocates (NACA) and the American
Association for Justice analyzed the same class actions filed in 2009
and drew very different conclusions,208 in part by noting that more
than half of all class action settlements did not require a claim form
and therefore many cases resulted in a higher percentage of claims
paid.209 Further, the NACA lauded the impact of injunctive and other
remedies.210
Law professors as well as administrative agencies, such as the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, have provided additional
203 See, e.g., MAYER BROWN LLP, DO CLASS ACTIONS BENEFIT CLASS MEMBERS? AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CLASS ACTIONS 1–2 (2013), http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/
uploads/Documents/PDFs/2013/December/DoClassActionsBenefitClassMembers.pdf
[http://perma.cc/DT6J-T2YE].
204 The report stated that thirty-three percent of the class actions studied resulted in
settlement, “half the average” for individual litigation. Id. at 2. Reviewing eighteen cases
resolved by “claims-made settlements,” the firm reported finding “meaningful data” on six.
Id. at 7. The review also complained that in that set of 148 cases, none had gone to trial. Id.
at 3. But the report did not add that such a result was not aberrant, given that one in one
hundred civil cases end with a trial. As noted, we identified fifty of the 2976 cases that went
to trial in 2015 were class actions.
205 Id. at 2, 8.
206 Id. at 2.
207 Id. at 12.
208 NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES & AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE, CLASS
ACTIONS ARE A CORNERSTONE OF OUR CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A REVIEW OF CLASS
ACTIONS FILED IN 2009 (2015), http://www.consumeradvocates.org/sites/default/files/
Class%20Action%20Report%202-27-15.pdf. For example, that study identified successful
class actions, such as an award of $219 million in the case against Bernie Madoff, who had
embezzled retirement funds by way of a Ponzi scheme. Also cited were awards of $27.8
million to property owners who suffered damages due to a 2008 spill of coal ash sludge
from a Tennessee Valley Authority coal plant, and a $4.8 billion provision of debt relief for
consumers victimized by the National Arbitration Forum. Id. at 4–5, 9.
209 Id. at 24. This report argued that, given the ongoing relations between financial
institutions and class members, direct payments were and could be relatively easy. See id.
at 25.
210 See id. at 4.
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studies with different sets of cases. Brian Fitzpatrick and Robert
Gilbert reviewed fifteen small-value consumer class actions; they iden-
tified payouts to class members ranging from one to seventy percent
of the class.211 Lynn Baker, Michael Perino, and Charles Silver did
extensive work to open the “black box” of federal court class action
securities settlements; they examined the seventy to eighty resolutions
in the years they reviewed to learn about the relationship of fee
awards to outcomes.212
A 2015 publication by the CFPB focused on 419 federal con-
sumer financial class action settlements from 2008 through 2012. The
CFPB concluded that the settlements resulted in benefits for at least
160 million consumers, providing $2 billion in cash relief and $644 mil-
lion in in-kind relief.213 The CFPB reported an average claims rate of
twenty-one percent across 105 settlements,214 as well as 133 of the 419
settlements relying on automatic distributions.215
Aggregation—and its challenges—are not limited to the United
States;  questions of utility have been examined in other jurisdictions.
In Canada, for example, the University of Montréal has launched a
“Class Actions Lab”  to gain comprehensive data and to calculate the
economic benefits in monetary class actions. One analysis found that
in about sixty percent of fifty-one class actions reviewed in Québec, a
“substantial majority of the class members” were compensated.216
211 Brian T. Fitzpatrick & Robert C. Gilbert, An Empirical Look at Compensation in
Consumer Class Actions, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 767, 770 (2015). Settlements with the
highest compensation rates relied on automatic payments that did not require class
members to file claims forms. Id. at 770, 781–83; see also Brian T. Fitzpatrick,
An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 811 (2010). That review focused on attorney fee awards and identified $33
billion in class action settlements in 2006 and 2007 of which $5 billion was awarded to class
action lawyers. Id. at 816–45. In work published in 2000, Deborah R. Hensler, joined by
Nicholas M. Pace, Bonnie Dombey-Moore, Elizabeth Giddens, Jennifer Gross, and Erik K.
Moller, found that from thirty to one-hundred percent of settlement funds were paid to
class members in ten illustrative class action settlements. See generally DEBORAH R.
HENSLER, NICHOLAS M. PACE, BONITA DOMBEY-MOORE, BETH GIDDENS, JENNIFER
GROSS & ERIC K. MOLLER, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR
PRIVATE GAIN (2000).
212 Lynn A. Baker, Michael A. Perino & Charles Silver, Is the Price Right? An Empirical
Study of Fee-Setting in Securities Class Actions, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1371, 1375–81 (2015).
The authors examined 431 securities class action settlements from January 1, 2007 to
December of 2012 to calculate these figures. Id. at 1380.
213 CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 181, § 1, at 11; id. § 8, at 4, 16. Of the R
251 settlements reporting data, $1.1 billion had been paid or was scheduled to be paid in
cash, debt forbearance, and cy pres payments for the benefit of class members. Id. § 8, at 4
n.5.
214 CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 181, § 1, at 17. R
215 Id. § 8, at 20.
216 Catherine Piché, The Value of Class Actions, THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
(forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3009743.
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But whether an anecdote or a genuine “study,” information defi-
cits abound. What Nicholas Pace and William Rubenstein called a
“veil of secrecy” shrouds class action litigation from “the moment the
judge signs off on the agreement.”217 Pace and Rubenstein looked at
court records in thirty-one class settlements, interviewed participants
in fifty-seven cases, and concluded that public data (as contrasted with
what insiders knew) were available in “fewer than one of five closed
cases.”218
Yet, despite the limits on the information, the challenges of
implementing remedies have become fodder for critics. As the pro-
posed Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017 reflects, busi-
nesses and law firms associated with defendants use uneven
distributions as arguments against class certification and for limiting
court awarded attorneys’ fees. The 2017 Act would provide that,
before a court may certify a class, the party seeking certification must
“affirmatively demonstrate . . . a reliable and administratively feasible
mechanism” both for identifying class members and “for distributing
directly to a substantial majority of class members any monetary relief
secured for the class.”219 Further, before fees may be awarded to class
counsel, “the distribution of any monetary recovery” to class members
must be “completed.”220 The details proposed include “the total
amount paid directly to all class members,” an estimate of the num-
bers of class members, those who received payment, “the average
amount (both mean and median) paid directly,” the range, and the
purpose of any other payments, including to the class counsel.221 The
legislation then calls on the federal judiciary to transmit to Congress
“for public dissemination” information on fund distribution.222
The proposed bill does not address who pays for the data collec-
tion but enjoins judges from awarding fees to lawyers who worked
(possibly for years) until the data are “in.” The bill puts the onus on
plaintiffs’ lawyers seeking fees to provide the Federal Judicial Center
and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts with “an accounting
217 See Nicholas M. Pace & William B. Rubenstein, How Transparent Are Class Action
Outcomes? Empirical Research on the Availability of Class Action Claims Data (RAND
Inst. For Civil Justice, Working Paper No. WR-599-ICJ, 2008), http://www.billrubenstein.
com/Downloads/RAND%20Working%20Paper.pdf; see also Stephen Yeazell,
Transparency for Civil Settlements: NASDAQ for Lawsuits?, in CONFIDENTIALITY,
TRANSPARENCY, AND THE U.S. CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 143 (Joseph W. Doherty, Robert T.
Reville & Laura Zakaras eds., 2012).
218 See Pace & Rubenstein, supra note 217, at v. R
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of the disbursement of all funds paid by the defendant pursuant to the
settlement agreement.”223 Under that provision, the plaintiffs’ bar
both bears the burden of collecting information and the risks of distri-
bution failures.
Another response to remedial challenges comes from the current
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules which, in August of 2016, circu-
lated proposals to amend Rule 23. After the 2017 Fairness Act was
introduced, the federal judiciary asked Congress to defer to the Rules
Enabling Act process, rather than legislate changes for class
actions.224 The Advisory Committee’s new provisions, altered slightly
as of April of 2017, would direct judges, when reviewing class settle-
ments, to consider whether class members are treated “equitably rela-
tive to each other.”225 The proposed Rule also calls on judges to assess
“the effectiveness of the proposed method of distributing relief to the
class, including the method of processing class-member claims,”226 and
to require some form of disclosure about “side settlements” (that in
some cases have been used to buy off potential objectors). But, while
raising the issue of a proposed system of “distributing relief” at settle-
ment, the pending rule revision neither requires information on imple-
mentation nor offers means by which, post-settlement, subsets of
litigants could petition the court for assistance.227 Thus, although the
new rule is a step in the direction of considering post-settlement chal-
lenges, it does not oblige either the parties or the court to gather and
223 Id.
224 See Letter from David G. Campbell, Chair, Comm. On Rules of Practice &
Procedure of the U.S. Judicial Conference, & John D. Bates, Chair, Advisory Comm. On
Civil Rules of the U.S. Judicial Conference, to Bob Goodlatte, Chairman, Comm. On the
Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 14, 2017).
225 COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF APPELLATE, BANKRUPTCY, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 214 (2016)
[hereinafter Rule 23 Proposed Revisions, August 2016], https://www.regulations.gov/
contentStreamer?documentId=USC-RULES-CV-2016-0004-0002&contentType=pdf
(amending Rule 23(e)(2)(D)). For revisions, see Text of Proposed Rule 23, in AGENDA
BOOK OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 105, 106–07 (Apr. 25–26, 2017)
[hereinafter Rule 23 Proposed Revisions, April 2017], from the Committee’s April meeting
“briefing book,” available at http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-04-civil-
agenda_book.pdf.
226 RULE 23 PROPOSED REVISIONS, AUGUST 2016, supra note 225, at 214 (amending R
Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(ii)).
227 A proposed note put forth in August of 2016 would have added that it “may be
important to provide that the parties will report back to the court on the actual claims
experience.” Id. at 222. But in the April 2017 revisions, those words are deleted, and the
revised note would state: “Because some funds are frequently left unclaimed, the
settlement agreement ordinarily should address the distribution of those funds.” Rule 23
Proposed Revisions, April 2017, supra note 225, at 111. R
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to put the experiences entailed in implementation and distribution
data on the record.
Here, I outline a different approach that would require litigants
and courts to gather and make public information on remedies.
Before approving settlements for structural or monetary relief, courts
should require that such agreements include periodic notices to claim-
ants, regular reporting about implementation (with privacy for indi-
viduals when appropriate),228 and a method of returning to court, if
conflicts arise across sets of claimants. The courts should thus build in
ongoing relationships with litigants to maintain affiliations sufficient
for the exercise of continuing jurisdiction during the full span of an
aggregate. While improvements in class action and MDL communica-
tions have come by way of notice coupled with group chats enabling
interactions among litigants and courts,229 more structured rules are
needed to engage judges in oversight during this third phase of
aggregation.
The goals of doing so would not be to inhibit certification or to
price plaintiffs’ attorneys out of the class action market. Rather, the
obligations should be imposed on both plaintiffs and defendants,
charged with bringing to fruition the settlements that they crafted.
Doing so ought to be predicated on concerns about “decency” and
“fairness” that were once seen as distinct from constitutional require-
ments but should now be understood as part of the “process due” to
litigants.
Placing this third phase of class actions within the adjudicatory
fold opens up the possibility of post-settlement disputes, which in turn
requires a returning to questions raised in the 1960s about just how
binding class action judgments should be. The current approach relies
on a doctrine that frames such issues as “collateral” attacks on a judg-
ment. A well-known example comes from the litigation related to
Agent Orange, a toxic substance that harmed soldiers and civilians in
Vietnam when the United States sprayed herbicides; years later,
Agent Orange was documented to have caused injuries.230 In 1983, the
Honorable Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York
famously certified a class of all persons who had served from 1961 to
228 For a parallel suggestion, see Letter from Brian Wolfman, Kevin M. Clermont, Brian
Fitzpatrick, Deborah R. Hensler, Alexandra D. Lahav, Geoffrey P. Miller, Nicholas M.
Pace & Charles Silver, to Richard Marcus, Assoc. Reporter, Advisory Comm. on Civil
Rules (Mar. 17, 2015), which dicusses the proposed class action disbursement disclosure
rule (the new Rule 23(i)).
229 See Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Samuel Issacharoff, The Participatory Class Action, 92
N.Y.U. L. REV. 846 (2017).
230 See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC
DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1987).
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1972, were in or near Vietnam, and were injured by exposure to these
chemicals.231 That case was settled on the eve of trial, with a $180
million fund providing for payments from 1985 until 1994.232
One set of challenges to this settlement emerged in 1989 and
1990; individuals went to state court and argued that they should be
able to pursue claims because their injuries were not manifest until
after the 1984 settlement was negotiated.233 The cases were removed
to federal court and sent to Judge Weinstein, who dismissed the claims
on the grounds that the new plaintiffs had been part of the original
class and covered under the settlement as “future claimants,” and the
Second Circuit affirmed.234 In the late 1990s, other plaintiffs—Daniel
Stephenson and Joe Isaacson—became part of an MDL, once again
assigned to Judge Weinstein, who likewise dismissed their claims as
precluded by the prior litigation.
But in its 2001 decision, the Second Circuit invoked Hansberry v.
Lee and reversed; the court concluded that while the soldiers were
within the class (individuals serving in Vietnam during the relevant
decade), the 1984 settlement had made no provision for individuals
whose injuries had not become manifest before the settlement fund
expired in 1994.235 Given the lack of the unity of interests that
Hansberry required between representative and the represented, the
new plaintiffs were to have an opportunity to raise their claims.236
The issue went to the Supreme Court, where the questions about
the finality of class action judgments became entangled with whether
the federal courts could, through the All Writs Act, take cases begun
in state courts and approve their removal to federal court. In 2002, in
an unrelated case, the Court held that the All Writs Act could not be
the basis for removal.237 The Agent Orange litigation thus foun-
dered.238 Although the Supreme Court has dealt with questions of col-
231 In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
232 See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 253 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing the
sequence of rulings).
233 See Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 510 U.S. 1140 (1994); Hartman v.
Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 510 U.S. 1140 (1994); see also In re “Agent Orange”
Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1430 (2d Cir. 1993); Ryan v. Dow Chemical Co., 781 F.
Supp. 902, 912–14 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
234 In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1436 (2d Cir. 1993).
235 Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 260–61.
236 The question of whether new litigation was precluded was decided; the court did not
reach the issue of whether Dow Chemical could rely on a military contractor defense that
would result in preclusion of relief. Id. at 261. On remand, those defenses resulted in the
plaintiffs’ loss. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 517 F.3d 76, 92–102 (2d Cir. 2008),
aff’g 304 F. Supp. 2d 404, 441–42 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
237 Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28 (2002).
238 The per curiam in the Isaacson case relied on the Court’s decision in Syngenta. Dow
Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111, 112 (2003). The Second Circuit decision in
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lateral attacks in other arenas,239 it has not addressed how courts, post
settlement, could incorporate, rather than reject, the problems of
implementation and the parameters of relief.
Rather than conceptualize settlements as closed upon approval,
aggregate resolutions (for injunctions or money) should be seen as
ongoing until all relief is accorded. Building on ideas in the 1960s Rule
23 drafters’ memos, once a court has a “sufficient connection with a
class situation,” it should retain power not only to decide questions
related to absentees at certification and settlement, but also to
respond to questions arising during aggregation’s third phase.240
Appreciating what the Mullane Court described as the “vital state
interest” (in that context to use aggregation to resolve the numbers of
claims that could arise from pooled trusts), courts which are the
homes of aggregation (via class certification or MDL transfers) ought
to have continuing and nationwide jurisdiction over related claims,
including—as in Agent Orange—of groups arguing that the settlement
ought not preclude their claims.
As in Mullane and Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, the vehicle for
generating affiliation among absentees and courts would be notice in
settlements to inform litigants that, if they can establish that settle-
ment parameters did not systematically take their interests into
account, judges would have to consider readjustments. If any cases
were subsequently filed in state courts in efforts to avoid federal juris-
diction, the Court could revisit its All Writs Act jurisprudence to
permit removal, rely on the Anti-Injunction Act to require removal
“in aid of” the aggregate’s court jurisdiction, or invoke Mullane-like
due process authority and use the fact of the location in a court of a
settlement (analogized to a pooled trust) as the basis for its jurisdic-
Stephenson was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court. Hence, the Court did not
address the question that was posed in the certioriari petition: whether “absent class
members are precluded from relitigating the issue of adequacy of representation through a
collateral attack on a class settlement, after class members have a full opportunity to opt
out . . . , object, and appeal, and after both the trial court and the court of appeals, in the
course of approving the settlement, expressly determined that the class representatives
adequately represented the entire class.” Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d
Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 539 U.S. 111 (2002) (No. 02-271).
239 See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); see also Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir.
1999).
240 The idea of expanding the role for courts under Rule 23 can also embrace MDL
proceedings, as reflected in a proposal by John Rabiej to create a Rule 23.3, to structure
judicial authority under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for MDL litigation. See
Letter from John K. Rabiej to the Hon. John Bates, Chair, Federal Rules Committee (May
19, 2017) (on file with the New York University Law Review).
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tion.241 That exercise of authority is a kind of “jurisdiction by neces-
sity”242 that propelled the Mullane ruling.
The result would be that post-settlement disagreements should be
seen not as “collateral to” but as a part of the initial litigation. Judges
would be called upon to reconsider whether the identity of interests
that existed at certification and settlement had diminished.243 In terms
of concerns about spawning “multiple bites of the litigatory apple” (as
the D.C. Circuit raised when finding a common law doctrine of virtual
representation244), the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. Sturgell
provides a model for analyzing the degree to which identity of inter-
ests remains between new claimants and the original litigants. The fact
of certification at a class action’s inception and at settlement should
create presumptions that the results should remain in place, but
should not be read as flatly preclusive of arguments that new issues
require reconsideration of distributional outcomes.245 Of course, some
settlements have built opportunities into their procedures to revisit
aspects of their decisions or deliberately put off some issues. My sug-
gestion is that whether parties do so or not, such opportunities be part
of the structure of approval of aggregate settlements.
In addition to questions about how a third phase affects preclu-
sion doctrine, issues of incentives need to be addressed. The numbers
that I provided at the outset about the many unrepresented civil liti-
241 In exchanges among the Justices when Mullane was pending, Justice Black pointed
out in a March 3, 1950 note, that the N.Y. court had “personal jurisdiction over the
trustee.”  An outline of the opinion, dated March 25, 1950, described the first point on
jurisdiction to include “[r]egardless of technical classifications, this type of proceeding . . .
support[ed] judgment, provided only that those affected are properly notified.” See Papers
of Robert H. Jackson, 1816-1983 (on file at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,
Box 164, No. 378, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.).
242 Class Actions—Some Further Thoughts 1962, supra note 1, at 9; see also Linda S. R
Mullenix, Policing Non-Class Aggregate Settlements: Empowering Judges Through the All
Writs Act (UNIV. OF TEX. SCH. OF LAW PUB. LAW & LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER
SERIES, NO. 572, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2898980.
243 The Court refused a federal common law rule that would have added new grounds
for preclusion. Instead, it reiterated its adherence to the “fundamental nature of the
general rule that a litigant is not bound by a judgment to which she was not a party.”
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 898 (2008). The Court imposed parameters on the
permissible forms of preclusion: preclusion can only occur if “at a minimum . . . [t]he
interests of the nonparty and her representative are aligned” and “either the party
understood herself to be acting in a representative capacity or the original court took care
to protect the interests of the nonparty.” Id. at 900.
244 Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d 965, 975 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
245 Another exemplar comes from Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
providing that when there is new information that “with reasonable diligence, could not
have been discovered” at the relevant time (here settlement, rather than trial), judges may
provide some form of relief from judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
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gants are reminders that procedural aspirations need to be accompa-
nied by provisions for lawyers. Rather than burdening only plaintiffs’
attorneys, as the pending Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of
2017 would do, I suggest that a system be structured to oblige both
settling parties and the court to make remedies effective. Judges
should be required to ask—and both parties to respond—about get-
ting results to individuals. Doing so will augment the information as
well as help develop techniques to achieve more successful distribu-
tions. Current models include settlements that require defendants (not
claims facilities) to make payments directly to consumers;246 insist that
defendants who have access to data on class members provide assis-
tance in distributing relief;247 and simplify claims forms when
required.248
Moreover, Rule 23 could commend that, in appropriate cases,
courts meet regularly and, presumptively, on the record, with all the
parties’ lawyers to learn about barriers to recovery. Further, the Rule
could permit judges to tax uncooperative defendants by requiring set-
tlements to have additional funds, set-aside, to pay the time of plain-
tiffs’ lawyers for enforcement work, unless defendants use their best
efforts to implement remedies. If implementation succeeds, then these
set-aside funds could revert to defendants. In addition, while settle-
ments under Rule 23 now recognize that plaintiffs may have more
than one opportunity to opt out, the Rule does not direct judges to
regulate the fairness of “back door” provisions permitting defendants
to withdraw when insufficient numbers of plaintiffs agree to be bound.
Just as side agreements have become a “trigger warning,” prompting
courts to inquire about the quality of the settlement, back doors
should likewise be seen as a prompt for court inquiries into the rea-
sons why significant numbers of claimants decline to be included and
whether adjustments are needed.
On the plaintiffs’ side, the current class action and MDL land-
scape includes what some call “peace premiums,” paid to clients and
their lawyers who join settlements. Incentives to make remedies effec-
tive could similarly have benefits, such as interim fee payments to
class lawyers and sliding-scale fee awards, with higher percentages
paid to lawyers who distribute funds successfully and economically.
Moreover, one could enlist in MDLs the individually-retained plain-
tiffs’ attorneys who file the cases initially (IRPAs, as Denny Curtis,
246 See, e.g., CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 181. R
247 See, e.g., In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 231 F.R.D. 52 (D. Mass. 2005).
248 See Piché supra note 216, at 25. R
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Deborah Hensler, and I once called them249). When IRPAs are
involved and if individualized work is needed,250 structured fee awards
could link payments to IRPAs for client-centered work done to imple-
ment remedies. In short, rather than assume that the delineation
between the class as an “entity” onto itself, as contrasted with an
“aggregate” of individuals, the framing may shift over a litigation’s
lifespan. The class as an “entity” may dominate pre-settlement, while
disaggregation and more individualization may be relevant after
settlement.
What is the good to be produced by the potential that I have
outlined for more disputes and more work for the lawyers and judges
involved in aggregation? The under-documented and under-regulated
set of interactions among lawyers, clients, court-authorized auxiliary
personnel, and judges needs to be brought within the mix of constitu-
tional values and common decency that animated the original Rule 23.
Reorienting the process due is again required: Distributional debates
inside a claims resolution system should not be left to the private deci-
sion-makers authorized under such settlements without a subsequent
opportunity for a return to public courts. The concerns about legiti-
macy that have come to lace the new doctrine of personal jurisdiction,
focused on defendants’ affiliations with jurisdictions, need to become
part of aggregation’s third phase, predicated on the importance of
ongoing affiliations between the courts and the people to whom reme-
dies are owed.
Moreover, due process is not the only relevant constitutional
touchstone; First Amendment concerns also come into play. A line of
cases recognizes a First Amendment right to have access to govern-
ment proceedings in criminal and civil litigation.251 Yet lower courts
have debated, for example, whether reports by monitors appointed to
249 Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the
Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 300 (1996); see,
e.g., In re Thirteen Appeals Arising Out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 56
F.3d 295, 300 (1st Cir. 1995); In re Nineteen Appeals Arising Out of the San Juan Dupont
Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 982 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1992).
250 See Order Denying Non-Class Counsel’s Motions for Attorneys’ Fees, In re
Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2672
CRB (JSC), 2017 WL 1474312, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2017). Judge Charles Breyer
denied “244 motions for attorneys’ fees and costs filed by attorneys who did not serve as
Class Counsel . . . [b]ecause Volkswagen did not agree to pay these fees and costs as part of
the Settlement, and because Non-Class Counsel have not offered evidence that their
services benefited the class, as opposed to their individual clients.” Id. Such lawyers could,
of course, recoup fees from individual clients with whom they had retainers. Id.
251 See, e.g., Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014); N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 684
F.3d 286 (2d Cir. 2011).
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oversee injunctions are “judicial documents” to which access is consti-
tutionally obliged.252 Research in both the United States and Canada
shows how rare are “final, clear, and straightforward accounting”
reports that detail how settlements are implemented.253 What I am
proposing is public access to post-decision implementation through a
reading of the First Amendment, understood as obliging that filings
related to the monitoring of remedies through aggregate settlements
become part of the judiciary’s records and be open to the public.
Reasons for doing so come in part from ideas that Jeremy
Bentham advanced centuries ago about the value of public access.
“Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison
with publicity, all other checks are of small account.”254 What today
we call “transparency” was a practice that Bentham thought could
impose discipline; “the more strictly we are watched, the better we
behave.”255 And the behavior he sought to affect was that of judges.
“Publicity is the very soul of justice. . . . It keeps the judge himself,
while trying, under trial.”256 Such “notification” of the public not only
imposed oversight but also a possibility of reform.257 Once informed,
public opinion could exercise its authority to “enforce the will of the
people by means of the moral sanction.”258
In Bentham’s wake, I have argued that publicity in democracies
helped to move members of the public from the passivity of spectators
252 Compare United States v. Erie County, 763 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2014) (requiring access
to a monitor’s report related to jail conditions), with IDT Corp. v. eBay, 709 F.3d 1220,
1224 (8th Cir. 2013) (declining to require access), and SEC v. Am. Int’l Grp., 712 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that reporters had no common law or First Amendment right of
access to reports ordered to be provided by an independent consultant, dispatched
pursuant to a court decree). See generally Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in
Courts: Changing the Experiences and Logics of the Public’s Role in Court-Based ADR, 15
NEV. L.J. 1631 (2015).
253 Piché, supra note 216, at 27. R
254 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, supra note 106, at 355 (“Of Publicity and R
Privacy, as Applied to Judicature in General, and to the collection of the Evidence in
Particular.”).
255 UCL FACULTY OF LAWS, BENTHAM PROJECT, THE MORE STRICTLY WE ARE
WATCHED, THE BETTER WE BEHAVE (2007), available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/Bentham-
Project/site_images/Leaflets/Panopticon%20Bentham%20DL%20UPDATED.pdf. The
quote comes from 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, WRITINGS ON THE POOR LAWS 277 (Michael
Quinn ed., 2001); and Bentham, Organization of Judicial Establishments, supra note 51, at
316. The website and the project’s pamphlet also provide a copy of Bentham’s emblem,
which included an “all seeing eye, framed by the words ‘Mercy, Justice, Vigilance.’”
Bentham Project, UCL Faculty of Laws, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bentham-project (last
visited July 26, 2017).
256 BENTHAM, Organization of Judicial Establishments, supra note 51, at 316; see also R
BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, supra note 106, at 355. R
257 PHILIP SCHOFIELD, UTILITY AND DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 261 (2006).
258 Id. at 263.
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to an active posture as “observers,” not only possessing the moral
authority of critique,259 but also the political power in democracies to
argue for legal change. Centuries after Bentham, and in global net-
works awash with hackers, we know about disinformation as well as
information overload, and that notices generated through Rule 23
sometimes go unread.
But class action notices are information-forcing, putting issues
onto the public screen. The 1960s’ mix of paternalism and egalitari-
anism produced the insistence to do “something” to inform litigants
and the public about the decisions that would affect their rights.
Notice served as one placeholder for a relationship between absent
litigants and courts to make legitimate the decisions resolving their
claims. That “gesture” of notice did not produce legions of individuals
personally appearing in courts, but it did produce bodies of law
debating how to shape remedies for millions, as well as extensive
media coverage of class actions and a host of enacted and proposed
reforms.
To conclude, one last return to the 1960s is in order, when the
drafters of Rule 23 invoked Chafee’s concerns about “common
decency” as reflecting the need to let those affected by judgments
know that resolutions were in the offing. Today, more than politeness
and paternalism are at stake. Courts and litigation are the objects of
attack, and they need to reassert their own role, “at home,” as institu-
tions central to democratic governance. As in the 1960s, judges should
be enlisted again to engage those affected—litigants and the public—
because (to borrow phrases from Mullane260) it is “vital” to state
interests that courts be accessible and accountable. The reason to
shape a third phase is to build relationships both with subsets within
the aggregate and with the public, to illuminate the benefits as well as
the pitfalls of collective redress.
259 See Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and Public
Sphere(s), 5 L. & ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 226 (2011); see also JONATHAN CRARY,
TECHNIQUES OF THE OBSERVER: ON VISION AND MODERNITY IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 1–24 (1990).
260 339 U.S. at 313.
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